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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the democratisation of South Africa's foreign trade
policy, by evaluating the negotiations surrounding the establishment of a free
trade area between South Africa and the European Union (EU). Democracy
here is defined as a form of government that rests on three components
namely, public participation in and public debate over policy formulation and a
governing elite that is responsive to the needs of the majority of the
population.
The thesis firstly outlines the process of negotiation itself, looking at the
developments that shaped the years of talks. It examines the nature of the
final agreement, called the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement
(TDCA). It focuses on the Co-operation Agreements that were concluded,
South Africa's partial accession to the Lomé Convention and the details of the
free trade agreement. It finds that although the negotiations took very long to
complete and the EU proved to be a tough negotiator, there are a number of
opportunities for South Africans in the TDCA.
In the second section the internal process in developing a South African
negotiating mandate is examined. This is done to conclude whether or not
South Africa's foreign trade policy is being formulated in a democratic
manner. However, first of all the question why the democratisation of foreign
trade policy formulation is important is addressed. Two possible theories are
advanced. Firstly, globalisation has forced countries to lure foreign direct
investment (FDI) as a matter of urgency. Seeing as FDI is mostly tied up with
western nations that prefer democracies, states are opting to democratise.
The focus is to a large extent on satisfying international actors. Or
alternatively, the very survival of the nascent democracy today depends on
the consultative nature of domestic economic and international economic
policy formulation. This is not a question of choice with an external focus, but
rather a matter of urgency with purely an internal focus.
Four actors in foreign policy formulation, namely parliament, government, the
bureaucracy and civil society, are examined in order to understand whether
they had access to the process and whether these institutions themselves
have been democratised since 1994. The thesis finds that the process was to
a large extent democratic in nature.
However, the thesis also finds that no matter how democratic policy
formulation is in South Africa, the options for policy are limited by a number of
international elements. These include globalisation, regional trading blocs like
the European Union, and international organisations like the World Trade
Organisation.
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OPSOMMING
Die tesis evalueer die demokratisering van Suid-Afrika se buitelandse
handelsbeleid deur die onderhandelingsproses tussen die Europese Unie
(EU) en Suid-Afrika rakende die sluiting van 'n vryhandelsooreenkoms te
ontleed. Demokrasie word in die tesis definieer as 'n tipe regering wat rus op
drie komponente, naamlik deelname in en debat oor beleidsformulering en 'n
regerende elite wat die behoeftes van die meerderheid van die burgers in ag
neem in beleidsformulering.
Eerstens omskryf die tesis die gebeure wat die onderhandelingsproses
beïnvloed het. Die finale ooreenkoms word oorweeg teen die agtergrond van
die samewerkingsooreenkomste wat tussen die partye gesluit is, Suid-Afrika
se gedeeltelike deelname aan die Lomé Konfensie en die
vryhandelsooreenkoms. Die gevolgtrekkingword bereik dat ten spyte van die
feit dat die onderhandelings oor 'n hele aantal jare gestek het, en alhoewel die
EU 'n uitgeslape onderhandelaar was, die orreenkoms talle geleenthede vir
Suid-Afrikaners skep.
In die tweede instansie word die interne proses wat tot Suid-Afrika se
onderhandelingsmandaat gelei het, ondersoek. Dit is gedoen om vas te stel
of die beleid op 'n demokratiese manier geformuleer is. Daar word egter eers
bepaal waarom die demokratisering van buitelandse handelsbeleid belangrik
is. Twee moontlike teorie word geformuleer. Die eerste stel dit dat
globalisering lande forseer om direkte buitelandse beleggings aan te lok.
Siende dat buitelandse beleggings van westerlike state afkomstig is, wat
verkies om met demokratiese state sake te doen, word ontwikkelende lande
as te ware geforseer om veral hulle buitelandse beleidsformulering te
demokratiseer. In die alternatief kan dit betoog word dat die voortbestaan van
die demokrasie self afhang van 'n ekonomiese beleidsformulering wat beide
binnelandse en internasionale prosesse insluit. Dit is nie 'n kwessie van
keuse met 'n eksterne fokus nie, maar 'n noodsaaklikheid met 'n interne
fokus.
Vier groeperinge wat buitelandse beleidsformulering beïnvloed word
ondersoek, naamlik die Parlament, the regering, die burokrasie en die
burgerlike samelewing, om vas te stelof hierdie instansies toegang tot die
proses gehad het en of hierdie instansies self sedert 1994 gedemokratiseer
is.
Die tesis kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat al is die formulering van buitelandse
beleid hoé demokraties, word die moontlikehede vir beleidsformulering beperk
deur globalisering, streeksorganisasies soos die EU, en internasionale
organisasies soos the Wêreld Handelsorganisasie.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Democratic forms of government have become the norm rather than the
exception over the last couple of decades - in 1975 68% of all states were
under authoritarian rule and yet by 1995 this number had decreased to only
26%. This massive increase in democratisation coincides with the emergence
of the phenomenon of globalisation. This is no coincidence, as globalisation
thrives on economic policies that are more closely associated with democratic
governments than any other.
William Robinson argues that this global pressure to democratise has its
origins in the Unites States' search for a global political dispensation that will
ensure the economic and political dominance of the US over other nations.
For many decades it accommodated authoritarian regimes due to the stability
and opposition to socialism they provided,. but with the advent of globalisation
- that has benefited the US more than any other nation - the openness of
democratic states is preferred.
The defining features of our epoch, [... ], is the emergence of a
capitalist global economy. [It] brings with it the material basis for the
emergence of a singular global society, including the
transnationalisation of civil society and of political processes. The old
units of analysis - nation states - are increasingly inappropriate for
understanding the dynamics of our epoch, not only in terms of
economic processes, but also social relations and political systems.
Promoting democracy can only be understood as part of a broader
process of the exercise of hegemony [... ].1
Despite this perception that modern democracy is a tool to promote
globalisation and to maintain the current global economic inequalities,
democracy remains the only form of government that leaves sufficient room
and rights for the individual.
3
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Whereas many states are pushed towards democracy by the process of
globalisation, there is not enough global pressure to ensure the
democratisation of the entire state apparatus. Globalisation has little interest
in citizen rights and, therefore, there rests a certain onus on governments to
ensure that democratisation is extended to every aspect of life if the stability
associated with democracy is to be achieved. This, in turn, is crucial for the
governing elite to reap the benefits of the global economy.
South Africa also experienced a certain amount of global pressure to
democratise during the late 1980's and early 1990's, which eventually
translated itself into a negotiated transition towards democracy in South
Africa. However, the mere transition did not guarantee that democracy would
be the permanent form of government for Pretoria. South Africa had to
democratise the entire state apparatus and daily policy formulation processes
in the country.
But what do we actually mean when we are talking about the democratisation
of a state?
By merely looking at the syntax of the word we can deduce that it entails a
process whereby one becomes democratic or more democratic. However this
is in contrast to the ideas that we have had of democracy over the years. A
state is either a democracy or an authoritarian state and the lines between
these are very clearly demarcated. In a democratic state the government of
the day is elected through popular elections. In an authoritarian state a
dictator has named himself the ruler or leader of that particular state without
having been elected and rather calling on some right to that position.
To have held free and fair elections is no longer sufficient to ensure a
democratic government. Or as Tom Lodge points out, '[s]tarting democracy is
1 Robinson, W. 1995. 'Pushing polyarchy: the US-Cuba case and the Third World', Third
World Quarterly, Vol 16, No 4. pp 649-650
4
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easier than keeping it.,2 Citizens of numerous states are insisting more and
more on having a role in daily policy formulation and not to only be called
upon once every four to five years when popular elections are held. Potter et
al define 'democratisation' as,
'political changes moving in a democratic direction ... the character of
such movement over time is from less accountable to more
accountable government, from less competitive (or non-existent)
elections to freer and fairer competitive elections, from severely
restricted to better protected civil and political rights, from weak (or
non-existent) autonomous associations in civil society to more
autonomous and more numerous associations."
What is the expected outcome of democratisation or when is the process of
democratisation complete? If we accept that the expected outcome of
democratisation is a permanent democratic state, or a state which is expected
to remain democratic for years to come, then the best indication, some argue,
would be peaceful alternations between different political parties in the
governing position. However, there are many states that have been
democratic for generations and are expected to stay that way, that have never
seen a different party in the governing position.
Therefore, other criteria need to be looked at. In essence these would refer to
the fairness of the electoral system and the freedoms of individual choice".
Perhaps consolidation of democracy shows itself through the way in which
control and policy formulation moves further away from the state towards
popular participation. Which has important implications for all policy
formulations and also that of foreign policy and foreign trade policy.
2 Lodge, T. 1999. Consolidating Democracy: South Africa's Second Popular Election.
Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg.
3 Potter, D.; Goldblatt, D; Kiloh, M; &Lewis, P. 1997. Democratization. Polity Press.
Cambridge pp3 - 4
4 See Lodge, Op Cit.
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One of South Africa's biggest foreign policy and - indeed foreign trade policy
- challenges after its transition to democracy has been the formulation of a
new relationship between itself and its largest trading partner and foremost
political ally in the developed world, the European Union (EU). The talks
surrounding this aim needed to address a wide range of issues, including aid,
trade and co-operation in a number of development fields. The negotiations
took several years to conclude, but culminated in a comprehensive agreement
called the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA).
During the negotiations critique was levelled against South Africa's approach
to the talks and the European Union's limited vision for the partnership. The
critique against South Africa hinged on the fact that Pretoria was slow to
respond to the European mandate and that it co-contributed to a lengthy
negotiating period. South Africa's tardiness can, however, be attributed to its
attempts to make the process inclusive and democratic. However, the talks
have finally (for the majority of the aspects) been concluded and it is timely to
examine the significance of the negotiations to South Africa's foreign trade
policy formulation.
1.1 Limitations and Delimitations
Eighteen months after South Africa's second popular elections - that were
deemed free and fair by all observers - it is appropriate to examine whether
the democratisation of the South African state apparatus and its policy
formulation processes has indeed taken place.
For the context of this study I have decided to focus on andlimit the study to
the manner in which foreign trade policy formulation, considered a sub-field of
foreign policy formulation, has been democratised.
The reasons for this are, firstly, that foreign policy formulation in South Africa
has never really been considered to be participatory in nature and foreign
trade policy has always been the prerogative of the executive.
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Secondly, the conclusion of a bilateral trade, development and co-operation
agreement between South Africa and the EU provides us with a clear case
study to examine whether foreign trade policy formulation has indeed been
democratised. The process was initiated during South Africa's transition
phase and was only completed after the second democratic elections in South
Africa in 1999.
In terms of the negotiations the study will look at the entire negotiations and
will not only be limited to the way in which decision was reached in South
Africa. The study is however, limited to the role South Africa and the
European Union played in the negotiations. Wider processes in the Southern
African region and within the European Union that contributed to the talks will
not be examined.
1.2 Conceptualisation
The understanding of democracy that guides the thesis is one based on
Dahl's well-know writings on democracy. Dahl argues that democracy is
characterised by effective public participation in policy formulation and public
understanding and debate about policy options. However, it is important to
add a third defining character, namely the responsiveness of the decision
makers to the needs of the population. Dahl argues that control over the
agenda for policy formulation is important to the democracy but in the modern
state this is not always possible. Therefore, the responsibility to ensure that
issues of public concern are addressed lies with the governing elite.5
For the purpose of this study I understand the democrati~ation of foreign
policy and foreign trade policy within the same framework, to refer to the way
in which policy is formulated becomes more democratic - where the
formulation of policy becomes more accountable, more inclusive and
representative. The democratisation of foreign policy, therefore, refers to the
way in which actors outside of the executive are increasingly involved in the
5 See Dahl, R. 1998. 'On Democracy.' Yale University Press, New Haven & London. And
Dahl, R. 1989. 'Democracy and its Critics' Yale University Press, New Haven & London.
7
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policy formulation process of policy directions and have access to meaningful
forums in which to debate policy that has been formulated. However, our
understanding of the democratisation of foreign policy also has to extend to
the nature of policy. This means that democratically formulated policy will be
directed at the majority of the population. In South Africa's case policy should,
therefore, aim at poverty alleviation and wealth creation.
1.3 Research Guidelines
Neither the literature examined, nor the definition of democracy proposed in
the previous section, explicitly explains why democratising a country's foreign
policy is important. However, it is important to understand this if we are
concerned with whether or not South Africa's foreign policy formulation has
been democratised. For many decades we were content with the executive
making foreign trade policy decisions. Even today many well-established
democracies still rely on executive decisions for their foreign trade policy. The
countries that form part of the European Union have even sacrificed their
control over trade policy to the European Commission that makes decisions
on behalf of the member states. However, in South Africa - and other newly
established democracies - popular participation in foreign trade policy
formulation has received much attention. Why is this so?
Two potential theories are suggested in order to arrive at an understanding of
why the democratisation of foreign policy is important to the consolidation of
South Africa's democracy.
Once the reasons for the democratisation of foreign trade policy are identified
the thesis examines whether or not South Africa's foreign policy formulation
processes have become more democratic. The SA-EU TOCA negotiations
are used as a case study to examine these developments against. In order to
be able to answer this question, the first part of the thesis addresses the
processes by which a bilateral deal was concluded between South Africa and
the EU. It outlines the developments that surrounded the conclusion of a
trade deal between South Africa and the European Union, the contentious
l::S
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issues, the negotiating positions of the two parties, as well as the input third
actors had to the negotiations.
In addition, the thesis looks at four key variables of democracy, namely
participation, representation, transparency and openness. Although the
borders between these are blurred, they can be understood to translate into
the functions of parliament, government, the bureaucracy and the access
ordinary citizens have to policy formulation.
Parliament's participation in policy formulation at once tests participation and
representation. The bureaucracy, and the extent to which it represents the
demographics of South Africa, tests transparency and representation. The
way in which various government departments and institutions are co-opted in
the policy formulation process again tests transparency and participation.
Finally, the input civil society has - or can have - on the process tests
openness, participation and even transparency.
In order to arrive at a conclusion regarding the impact of the institutions
mentioned above, the thesis first of all examines whether these institutions
themselves have been democratised. Then, secondly, it looks at whether its
role as an institution in policy formulation is a democratic one. Even if
apartheid South Africa's parliament had had input in foreign policy formulation,
the policy itself could not have been considered democratic, as parliament
itself was not. It follows, therefore, that democratic processes do not alone
suffice and institutional make-up is also key to the democratisation process.
In order to test whether these institutions themselves have democratised, the
thesis examines their institutional make-up and roots. In order to establish
whether they form part of the policy formulation processes it examines to what
an extent these institutions could impact on or were invited to participate
within the negotiations. These evaluations mainly rest on interviews
conducted with various role players over the years of negotiation, the following
of newspaper articles and the various literature that has appeared during the
9
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negotiations or after the conclusion of the TOGA. The findings of the thesis,
therefore, rest on observations and analysis, rather than on empirical data.
However, during the research it became clear that no matter the nature of
South Africa's foreign trade policy formulation, certain global restraints were
placed on Pretoria's ability to reach a democratically formulated policy. The
fourth research question, therefore, asks how South Africa was limited by the
international arena in its policy formulation process.
These restraints identified include the phenomena of globalisation, the nature
of established regional trading blocs like the European Union and the impact
of international organisations that place limits on policy outcomes due to
internationally established policy directions. Globalisation is examined and
found to prescribe to developing countries to embrace the liberalisation of
trade. The EU severely restricted the outcome of the talks by insisting on the
compatibility of the South African agreement with all other agreements the EU
has entered to .hitherto. Finally, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is found
to prescribe certain details of a free trade agreement between two parties.
1.4 Data Gathering Process
Data collected for the purpose of the study can be divided in two sections, as
they reflect the two sections of the thesis. The first part that deals with the
actual events surrounding the establishment of a free trade area between the
two parties is based on years of research at the South African Institute of
International Affairs (SAIlA) as the Standard Bank European Union Research
Fellow. The fellowship closely followed the unfolding of the negotiations,
conducted numerous interviews with most role players both domestically and
internationally and made use of news reports and articles and research
papers from various organisations, as they became available.
The second part delves more into existing literature on democratisation, which
is followed by more observation techniques to deduce whether South Africa's
foreign policy formulation process has been democratised. As such,
lU
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therefore, the conclusions are based more on personal observation than on
quantitative data. The study is, therefore, qualitative in nature.
1.5 An International Move Towards Democracy
The current literature on democratisation pays scant attention to the reasons
why the democratisation of foreign policy - and foreign trade policy in
particular - has become important. However, a number of potential theories
are indirectly proposed.
Hypothesis One: G/obalisation has forced countries to lure foreign direct
investment (FOI) as a matter of urgency. Seeing as FOI is mostly tied up with
western nations that prefer democracies, states are opting to democratise,
especially their foreign policies, as this is the interface between the outside
world and the given state. The focus is to a large extent on satisfying
international actors.
The impressive increase in the number of democracies over the last couple of
decades is a well-documented fact. In 1991 Samuel Huntington identified
three waves of global democratisation with two reverse waves.6 The first was
from 1828-1926, when countries like the USA, Britain, France, Italy and
Argentina became democracies, with Italy, Germany and Argentina falling in
the first reverse wave from 1922-42. The second wave was from 1943-62
with the redemocratisation of Germany, Italy and the democratisation of
Japan, India and Israel. Brazil, Argentina and Chile fell in the second reverse
wave from 1958-1975. The third and most impressive wave has been
identified from 1975 onwards. Although it stretches over a couple of decades,
the number of countries that have democratised over this period is most
significant. Most continents changed towards democracy with Latin America
changing the most significantly with 90% of states regarded as democracies.
6 Huntington, S. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
University of Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma.
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In sub-Saharan Africa the dominant regime type pre-1975 was authoritarian,
yet by 1995, 67% states of the sub continent were proclaimed democracies."
Diamond, Linz and Lipset ascribe this increase in the popularity of democracy
to the discreditation of all other options:
'The global advance of democracy in the 1980's and early 1990's was
assisted by the demise of its historic ideological rivals. Fascism was
destroyed as a vital force in World War II. The appeals of Marxism-
Leninism withered with the harsh repressiveness, glaring economic
failures, and loss of revolutionary idealism of the existing Communist
regimes. More limited, quasi-socialist or mass-mobilisation models -
the Mexican, Yugoslav and Nasserite models - also lost their aura.
Almost universally, military regimes were shorn of any ideological
justification and legitimacy beyond a temporary intrusion to correct
political and social problems. Democracy became - partly by choice
and political learning and partly by default - the only model of
government in the world with any broad ideological legitimacy and
appeal."
This appeal can to a large extent be attributed to the impression that
democracies were generally economically more well off than their
authoritarian and communist counterparts. Ideologically there is a very clear
link between the state centric economies of authoritarian and communist
governments and between market-orientated economies and democratic
governments. This link is highlighted by the difference in national income,
were state centric economies perform less impressively than the market
orientated ones.
7 Potter, D.; Goldblatt, D; Kiloh, M; &Lewis, P. 1997. Democratization. Polity
Press. Cambridge. pp8-9
8 Diamond, L; Unz, J.J.; Upset, S.M. 1995. Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing
Experiences with Democracy. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado. pp 2-3
12
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There is a great body of literature by political theorists that comment on the
link between economic development and democratisation. The modernisation
theorists (like Upset and Diamond) identify a positive correlation between the
rise of per capita income and the rise of democracy; and others, that focus
on structural change, like Linz and Rustow, focus on the capitalist activities of
elites who favour democracy as an agent to greater economic activity. This
ties in with Robinson's argument that the promotion of democracies has an
elite focus; and Philip Cerny's work on the competition state."
The link between economic prosperity and democracy not only ensured
internal pressure for democratisation, but it also had a profound influence on
international investment trends. With the fall of the communist regime in
Eastern Europe and Russia and the rise of globalisation the western world
began to associate democracy with prosperity and stability and other regime
types were considered unstable. Seeing as investments and development aid
are most often tied up with the western powers and their views of states it
became more and more important to be a democratic state in order to secure
foreign direct investment. In addition, in order to be able to make loans from
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, certain basic democratic
principles had to be met. As a result a number of countries proclaimed
themselves to be democratic, although they still remain a far cry from actually
holding popular elections.
A classic example on the African continent is that of the 'Democratic' Republic
of the Congo (DRC). There is not much that is democratic about that country
and a number of cartoonists refer to the DRC as 'The-not-so-very-Democratic
Republic of the Congo'. However, proclaiming to be in the process of
democratising the state has become the right the late Laurent Kabila called on
to secure his position as the recognised leader of the DRC. However, it is
doubtful whether he was in fact planning on ever holding popular elections.
9 See Robinson, W. 1995. 'Pushing Polyarchy: the US-Cuba case and the Third World', Third
World Quarterly, Vo116, No 4. pp 649-650 and Cerny, P. 1997.'Paradoxes of the
Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization', Government and Opposition, Vol
32, Nr 2. pp251 - 274
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And yet, when he took over the reigns of the country, foreign aid was pledged
to help the country to democratise.
Countries like these have forced us - and international donor agencies and
investors alike - to reconsider what we consider to be the elements of a
democracy. Questions need to be posed to understand what the minimum
critical mass of a democracy is. Also one needs to understand the processes
by which countries become democratic. And how democracies are
consolidated. Increasingly a proclamation of democracy is no longer sufficient
to attract foreign direct investments and states are forced to embark on the
democratisation of the entire state apparatus. Given the international goal of
this democratisation it is self evident that the democratisation of foreign policy
and foreign trade policy will become key to this process.
This process is most often encouraged, and even funded, by other states that
wish to ensure the democratic nature of the given state in order to protect their
investments and to increase the potential for economic returns. (Again
William Robinson's viewpoint on US hegemony and democracy promotion
applies.)"? Larry Diamond points to the following:
A variety of instruments are available for international actors seeking to
promote, foster, or support democracy .... Such assistance may be of
financial or technical nature, but its goal is political: to develop
democratic institutions, practices, and capacities. Economic assistance
can also make a difference, if one presumes that (market-oriented)
economic development ultimately encourages democratisation, and
that economic improvement is at some point necessary to legitimate
and sustain a new democracy. A major aid instrument that states have
10 Robinson, W. 1995. 'Pushing Polyarchy: the US-Cuba case and the Third World', Third
World Quarterly, Vol 16, No 4. pp 649-650
14
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at their disposal and are increasingly inclined to use is conditionality -
tying desired forms of aid to democracy or political liberalisation."
He identifies a number of instruments that other states have at their disposal
to promote democracy. Under political assistance he mentions the
development of political institutions, legislative assistance, local government
assistance, the development of political parties and finally legal and judicial
assistance. However, it is economic assistance that is often key to the
survival of a democracy." Using conditionalities that are tied up with
democratisation, provides the greatest impetus to democratise all aspects of
political life.
Hypothesis Two: The very survive! of the nascent democracy today depends
on the consultative nature of domestic economic and international economic
policy formulation. This is not a question of choice with an external focus, but
rather a matter of urgency with purely an internal focus.
A good comparative example for the African continent is that of Latin America.
As Huntington has pointed out, there has been a wave of democratisation in
Latin America, which was followed by a wave of relapse into authoritarian rule.
This is most often attributed to the fact that no consolidation of democracy
took place. With the third wave of democratisation the Latin American
continent has performed well in establishing stable democratic governments.
The reasons for the success of the second wave lies in the consolidation of
democracy through the democratisation of the entire state apparatus and
greater, although far from perfect, redistribution of national income.
The Latin American experience has taught that, ironically, it is often economic
policy formulation that becomes the major point of contention in new
democracies and that can cause popular revolt. With the euphoria of a change
11 Diamond, L. 1995 .. Promoting Democracy in the 1990's: Actors and Instruments, Issues
and Imperatives. Report to the Carnegie Commission of Preventing Deadly Conflict,
Carnegie Corporation of New York.
12 Ibid.
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from a repressive system to a democratically elected government, the masses
also expect tangible differences in their economic situation, as exemplified by
other democracies. Larry Diamond points out that:
'New (as well as established) democracies around the world have
shown much greater capacity to launch bold economic reforms than
many critics could have imagined. Nevertheless, increased
unemployment and hardship for many middle- and lower-class groups
typically accompany such reforms. Moreover, fear of these
consequences often leads politicians to avoid instituting urgently
needed reforms, aggravating macro-economic imbalances and
throwing the economy deeper into crisis. History and logic suggest that
economic crisis and hardship cannot continue indefinitely without
undermining the legitimacy of democracy and gravely damaging its
quahty.:"
In order to avoid the undermining of democracy, new democracies therefore
often institute consultative forums in which economic policy can be formulated
in order to achieve consensus with the masses. However, the international
climate states operate in today, which is dominated by the process of
globalisation, have limited the option for economic policies quite drastically. In
order to become an active player in the global market neo-liberal economic
policies have to be accepted. In addition, the World Bank and the IMF have
over the years become even more prescriptive on economic policy making
that promotes neo-liberal ideologies. This leaves new democracies in a
difficult situation, as neo-liberal policies are seldom reconcilable with the
immediate needs of the poor in society.
In Latin America Von Mettenheim and Malloy make the observation that,
13 Diamond, L. 1995. Promoting Democracy in the 1990's: Actors and Instruments, Issues
and Imperatives. Report to the Carnegie Commission of Preventing Deadly Conflict,
Carnegie Corporation of New York.
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'[ ..] the central theme that emerges from recent experiences of governance
in Latin America is the profound tension between technocratic and
exclusive policy-making patterns deemed imperative by 'rational' neo-
liberal economic restructuring and the ideals of broad-based participation
of both citizens and associational groups historically implied by liberal and
pluralistic conceptions of democracy ... ,14
Foreign trade policy formulation is traditionally further removed from public
opinion, in the same way that foreign policy is in general considered the
domain of the government and not for ordinary citizens to decide. However,
with the global shift towards neo-liberal economic policies and the desire of
states to reap the benefits of globalisation, the liberalisation of trade has
become the main focus of foreign trade policy for most countries. This
liberalisation of the economy impacts directly on businesses throughout the
given country. Where businesses will be negatively affected they find a
seldom ally in labour that fears job losses due to the liberalisation of tariffs.
This provides the potential for vigorous debate surrounding the extent of
liberalisation and which sectors are to be protected. Therefore, policy
formulation tends to no longer involve only the executive, but is democratising
and incorporating the wishes of the majority.
Although Von Mettenheim and Malloy comment in general on economic policy
formulation, their observations have clear relevance to foreign trade policy
formulation:
'Economic policy can no longer be developed in isolation from elected
representatives and the diverse organisations that seek to represent
social groups. [ ... ] The stuff of politics - bargaining, negotiating and
compromise - is often critical for the successful implementation of
economic policies.:"
14 Von Mettenheim, K & Malloy, J. 1998. Deepening Democracy in Latin America. University
of Pittsburgh Press. Pittsburgh.
15 Ibid
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The latter of the two theories seems more satisfying and explanatory given the
South African situation.
I will now take a closer look at the democratisation process in South Africa
and the implications this has had for foreign trade policy formulation.
1.6 South Africa Becomes A Liberal Democracy
Throughout the apartheid years the National Party government proclaimed to
be a democratic government. However, it was quite clearly a very restricted
form of democracy or partial democracy."
With the elections of April 1994 South Africa instantly became the world's
favourite new democracy. The world stood awed at how a country embroiled
in racist violence could emerge as a single nation, queuing for hours and even
days to be able to cast their first vote. However, the elections alone did not
mean that democracy would be the order of the day. Many South Africans
feared that with the honeymoon period over the enormous ANC would soon
turn South Africa in a de facto one party state with a strong executive.
However, Mandela's government embarked on the arduous journey of
transforming South Africa into a true democracy. With the proclamation of the
second elections in South Africa as free and fair, it has been broadly accepted
that South Africa has truly become a liberal democracy - despite the fact that
some hiccups might exist here and there."
16 Potter et al define a partial democracy as 'a type of political regime in which the
accountability of government to citizens is more or less qualified; military, traditional or other
non-elected establishments within the state restrict the effect of elections and compromise the
authority of elected government. Elections are held, but organised to ensure that only certain
candidates can be elected; opposition political parties may exist and even make some
impact but the electoral system is organised to ensure that normally they would neither win an
election nor form a government. There are restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression
and access to alternative information. Some independent associations and organisations
critical of the state exist but are carefully monitored by the state.' pp5
17 I would like to once again use the definition supplied by Potter et alan a liberal democracy,
which 'is a type of political regime in which binding rules and policy decisions are made not by
the entire community but by representatives accountable to the community. This
accountability is secured primarily through free, fair and competitive elections in which
18
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The most pressing concern for both the Mandela and Mbeki presidency was
the upliftment of the millions of poor people in South Africa. The
Reconstruction and Development Programme (ROP) was initially used as the
main tool to address this situation. The ROP had five main programmes of
which one was the democratisation of the state and society. These
programmes were to a large extent donor driven and focused on the role of
the constitution, the Bill of Rights, the role of the national, provincial and local
government, social movements and NGO's and a democratic information
system in facilitating socio-economic development. In this way the seed to
democratise the entire state apparatus was planted.
On state level the transformation of the bureaucracy was - and remains -
high on the agenda, as well as the repositioning of South Africa on the
international arena. This in turn does not only mean the forging of new ties
with foreign countries, but also forging new and reinforcing old trade links that
have suffered during the years of sanctions and isolation.
On the foreign policy front South Africa made it quite clear that it would not be
dictated to and took some decisions that were frowned on by other countries,
including western powers and some on the African continent. In the first
instance, countries considered pariah by western nations were invited to
witness Nelson Mandela's inauguration. Secondly, South Africa shun its long
time ally in Taiwan in favour of Mainland China, which had great implications
for investments and development aid. Thirdly, South Africa opted to become
a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and not
to accept membership of COMESA, despite the fact that the ANC had had
observer status in COMESA during the apartheid years and not in SADC.
virtually all adult men and women have the right to vote and stand for elective office. Citizens
within a liberal democracy have the right: 'to express themselves without the danger of severe
punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the
government, the regime, the socio-economic order, the prevailing ideology' and 'to form
relatively independent associations or organisations including independent political parties
and interest groups'. pp4
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On the foreign trade policy side, the South African government was informed
by its macro-economic policy GEAR. In addition, president Mbeki has
commented frequently that South Africa has to become an active player on
the global market and must become part of the globalisation process. GEAR
advocates the liberalisation of tariffs to encourage domestic growth through
export growth. Amongst its stated aims, the following liberalisation principles
were included:
• A reduction in tariffs to contain input prices and facilitate industrial
restructuring, compensating partially for the exchange rate
depreciation; and
• An expansion of trade and investment flows in Southern Africa.
However, it is the GEAR policy that has brought the ANC-SACP-COSATU
alliance to the brink of collapse. The decision to negotiate a free trade
agreement with the country's largest trading partner, the European Union,
therefore, also came under some fierce criticism from the alliance partners.
There is sufficient evidence to support both theories outlined above.
Hypothesis One: International pressure provides the impetus for the
democratisation of foreign policy and foreign trade policy.
Given the long-standing relationship South Africa has had with the European
Union, the EU exerted significant pressure on the new government to
democratise. It provided a large amount of donor assistance for this process.
On first glance the EU's massive involvement in South Africa seems
surprising, but when one evaluates the history of European-South African
engagement the reasons are clearer.
In the Multi-Annual Indicative Programme: A Framework for Co-operation
between South Africa and the European Union of June 2000, it is pointed out
that,
20
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'The framework for co-operation with development partners (donors)
has been laid down by the South African authorities and there is only a
limited scope for donors to influence policies at macro and sectoral
level. The ROP White Paper, the GEAR Macro-Economic Strategy, the
priority-setting through the Medium Term Expenditure Framework
(MTEF) and the sector policies serve as guiding instruments for
development in SA. As a result, the priority areas of support by donors
by-and-Iarge fall within the ambit of policy directions of the
qovemrnent.i'"
The report further points out that whilst donor support seems to primarily focus
on basic services delivery and good governance, democratisation
programmes also receive substantial support from foreign donors. It is also
clear that the European Union remains South Africa's largest foreign donor
and, as already pointed out, their main focus is on the democratisation of
South Africa.
'EU grants and the European Investment Bank (EIB) loan facilities
together constitute the largest contribution to donor assistance to South
Africa. Since the democratic election, the EU has committed over
700million Euros. The EIB's two framework agreements with South
Africa (covering the period 1995 to June 2000) have opened up new
loan facilities amounting to 675million Euros. The EC development
programme in the period 1997-1999 focused on the strategic areas of
basic social services, private sector development and good governance
and democratlsation.:"
18 European Union Delegation to South Africa. 2000. Multi-Annual Indicative Programme: A
Framework for Co-operation between South Africa and the European Community. June,
2000. Durban, Republic of South Africa. Annex 6: Foreign Assistance and EU Co-operation.
19 Ibid.
21
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Although it is nowhere clearly stated that these funds were put towards
democratising South Africa's foreign policy or foreign trade policy, these funds
- especially the magnitude of the figures spent - created the climate in
which policy formulation is taking place in South Africa. All elements and
facets of public life are seen to be democratising and this clearly includes
foreign trade policy. The first real major decision that needed to be taken on
the foreign trade policy side was the agreement with the European Union.
Having played a key role in inspiring democratic practices, it was only natural
that the negotiations with the European Union would be approached in a
democratic manner from South Africa.
In this way it can be argued that the foreign assistance of the European Union
encouraged the democratisation of South Africa and by implication
encouraged the democratisation of South Africa's policy formulation
structures, which extended to the realms of foreign policy and foreign trade
policy formulation. Although Pretoria was a willing partner it is no secret that if
South Africa would have failed to democratise the state apparatus, the EU
would have been less willing to spend as much on development aid in the
country as it has done hitherto. In other words, there was a certain amount of
pressure on South Africa from an international actor to democratise its foreign
policy and foreign trade policy.
Hypothesis Two: The democratisation of domestic economic and foreign
trade policy is crucial to the very survival of the nascent democracy.
The consultative and democratic form of policy formulation, it can be argued,
was already well established in South Africa - through the activities of the
ANC political party and the SACP-ANC-COSATU alliance - at the time of the
democratic change. It should also not be forgotten that the entire process of
change in South Africa was a negotiated change, which firmly planted the
tradition of consultation.
CODESA, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, was the arena in
which South Africa's future was negotiated. CODESA represented 'the
LL
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broadest ever cross-section of the country's political leaders", including
nineteen parties: the ANC was joined by its allies, the SACP and the
Transvaal and Natal Indian Congresses, the NP was joined by a government
delegation, the IFP, the Democratic Party, five parties which controlled
'homeland' administrations and the four TBVC administrations and three
parties drawn from the tricameral parliament.
The role then president Nelson Mandela played in acknowledging the
interests of each and every group in South Africa further encouraged
democratic forms of policy formulation.
The stability of South Africa at this important juncture from apartheid to
democracy was dependent on every group in South Africa feeling safe and
represented in the new government. Peace and stability was balancing on a
knife's edge during the transition and without the prospect of every group
being included in future policy formulation processes, South Africa could
easily have fallen into a very nasty civil war. In other words, from the very
beginning it was clear that the democratisation of every facet of South African
life was key to the survival of the state.
It was, however, also clear that CODESA alone could not ensure a stable
democratic government. As Friedman pointed out in 1993,
[..]If the 'transition' which 'began' on 2 February 1990 really began a
long while before then, it will not end for a long while after the
negotiation process has seemingly ended. If South Africa is unlikely to
become another Lebanon or Yugoslavia, its journey to a consolidated
democracy is at most halfway. The test will not be whether democracy
and stability are achieved soon, but whether continued progress will be
made towards them.:"
20 Friedman, S, 1993. The Long Journey: South Africa's Quest for a Negotiated Settlement.
Raven Press. Johannesburg.
21 Ibid
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The first test for consolidating the CODESA outcome was the formulation of
the macro policy of the South African government, namely that of the ROP,
which was drawn up by the ANC in conjunction with its alliance partners. In
the process of drafting the document a large number of other key role players
were consulted, stretching as far as NGO's and other research organisations.
The government did well to consult as far as possible to draw up the ROP,
and this process would be replicated on a continuous basis in other fields,
importantly in that of economic policy formulation too.
In order to promote the democratisation process and to avoid conflict
regarding the government's economic policy, to promote inclusive policy
formulation and consensus-seeking, the National Economic Development and
Labour Council (NEDLAC) was launched in February of 1995_22 According to
the Nedlac reports of subsequent years,
'[its] origins lie in the struggle against apartheid, against unilateral
decision-making and in calls from all sectors of society for decision to
be taken in a more inclusive and transparent manner. It emerges out
of a recognition of the importance of seeking consensus on major
economic, social and development policies to ensure their success,
and out of an awareness, as President Mandela remarked at its launch,
that "our democratic gain will be shallow and persistently threatened if
they do not find expression in food and shelter, in well-paying jobs and
rising living standards.t''"
22 Nedlac is essentially a tripartite body that incorporates business, government and labour.
It also, however, gives a voice to a number of community organisations, although at a lower
level. Government is represented through four government departments, namely Finance,
Public Works, Labour and Trade and Industry. Business is represented by Business South
Africa and NAFCOC and Labour by NACTU, FEOUSA and COSATU. These representative
work in four chambers, namely the labour market chamber, the trade and industry chamber,
the public finance and monetary policy chamber or the development chamber. The SA-EU
TOCA negotiations were discussed in the trade and industry chamber.
23 Nedlac. Annual Report. Nedlac, Johannesburg. (Numerous Years)
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It is, therefore, quite clear that government was very aware of the potential
threats if they chose to exclude business and labour from economic policy
formulation. There is also a clear understanding that the upliftment of the
previous disadvantaged poor should be very high on the national agenda. It
is with this understanding that a consultative process was embarked on for the
negotiations surrounding the free trade agreement with Europe.
By ways of conclusion, Mills argues that South Africa's foreign policy focuses
on issues of concern, which are of national importance.
This necessitates the definition of South Africa's foreign policy in terms
primarily of domestic needs. A foreign policy in pursuit of such goals
would be a policy aimed at economic growth and reducing
unemployment, arguably (along with racial and political conciliation)
they key contemporary challenge facing South Africa where there are
four million unemployed and nearly 600,000 jobs required annually."
This supports the second Hypothesis that the democratisation of foreign trade
policy formulation is important to the internal consolidation of democracy.
24 Mills, G. SA Foreign Policy after Mandela. In SAIIA. 1999/2000. South African Yearbook of
International Affairs. Johannesburg.pp1-13
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CHAPTER TWO: THE CONTEXT OF THE SA-EU NEGOTIATIONS
Arguably the biggest foreign policy challenge that faced South Africa shortly
after its transition to democracy was the formalisation of its relationship with
its largest trading partner and political ally, the European Union (EU). It was
never foreseen that the process would be so complicated, so wrought by
controversy and it was never expected that the negotiations would take more
than five years to complete.
However, the negotiations have now for the largest part been concluded and
the time has come to evaluate the process. This section will look exclusively
at the negotiating process, the developments that shaped the talks and the
final agreement. It will highlight the issues surrounding the conclusion of a
deal. Only then will I evaluate how democratic a process the negotiations in
South Africa were.
In 1994 South Africa was undergoing major change in its political and social
make-up. These changes had to translate into a new constitution, new laws,
new governing structures and leaders. The future was unclear, the present
turbulent and the past cause for heartache. By contrast, the EU is seen as
the pillar of stability and predictability. However, it should be remembered that
it took them over 40 years to reach this point. The difference in the contexts
within which the agreement was negotiated would have a major impact on the
outcome of the agreement.
2.1 The European Union is Crafted ...
'After the devastation of the Second World War with 40 million deaths and
which brought Europe to its knees economically, surviving democratic leaders,
parliamentarians, academics and thinkers came together to seek the salvation
of Europe in unifying France and Germany in a body which would encourage
first economic and then political interdependence. The key ideas underlying
the building of modern Europe were outlined in the Schuman Declaration of
1950:
26
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"Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single
plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, which
will first create de facto solidarity. The coming together of the
nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old
opposition of France and Germany.
The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately
provide for the setting up of common foundations for
economic development as a first step in the federation of
Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which
have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of
war, of which they have been the most constant vlctlrns.?"
In this spirit the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established
in 1957 with six initial members: France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux
countries. Since then the Community has expanded and deepened and is
moving ever closer towards a federalist state (although, arguably this is not
the ultimate goal of all the members of the current EU structure.) It has
moved from a purely coal and steel community through communal trade
structures and recently, since signing the Maastricht Treaty, culminating in a
common foreign and security policy.
With signature of the latter in 1993, the European Community became the
European Union and abandoned its long-standing system of European
Political Co-operation (EPC) by adopting the concept of a Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP). The first five 'joint actions' of the Union's CFSP
were identified as the promotion of peace and stability in Europe, the Middle
East and the former Yugoslavia; support for the Russian parliamentary
election; and notably also support for the democratisation process in South
Africa.
25 Luff, P. 1996. A Brilliant Conspiracy? The Greycoat Press.
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This historic context in which South Africa engaged with the EU, already had a
considerable impact on the direction the negotiations would take. Willem
Smalberger - one of the chief South African negotiators commented in the
following way,
The EU entered the negotiations within the context of a policy
framework developed over almost 40 years. Trade policy is their
greatest competency and, in Margaret Thatcher's words, is a form of
pooled sovereignty. They have the advantage of repeated experience.
Euro jargon refers to second, third and fourth generation agreements
with clauses that have been thought through during many European
winters when there was enough time to ponder and to refine. They
have horizontal perspective and an institutional safeguard system that
is developed and sophisticated. This forced us to be twice as careful."
2. 1. 1 The EEC's Relationship with the Apartheid Government
Previously sanctions and the country's virtual isolation had hampered
relations between South Africa and the then European Economic Community
(EEC).27 In the years prior to South Africa's transition to democracy, the EEC
played a leading role in trying to reverse apartheid. It had a comprehensive
strategy towards ending the apartheid policy in South Africa: including not
only sanctions, but sporting isolation and the suspension of full diplomatic ties
with the pariah state, as well as supporting the Front-line States (South
Africa's neighbouring countries). The EEC attempted to reduce Southern
Africa's dependence on South Africa and actively encouraged and subsidised
26 Smalberger, W. 2000. Lessons learnt by South Africa during the Negotiations. In
Bertelsmann-Scott, T; Mills, G.; Sidiropoulos, E. The SA-EU Agreement: South Africa,
Southern Africa and the European Union. SAIIA. Johannesburg. pp47
27 Strictly speaking, the European Economic Community now embraces all three
communities, that is, the EEC, the ECSC, and the EAEC. Since the entry into force of the
Maastricht Treaty in November 1993, the European Community has become a component
part of the European Union, and legally there remains a difference between the two.
However, for general purposes 'the European Union' or 'the Union' is used to refer to what
used to be known as the European Community. (Bainbridge, T. & Teasdale, A. 1997. The
Penguin Guide to the European Union Penguin Books.)
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the former SADCC (Southern African Development Co-ordination
Conference)." To a lesser extent, the Lomé Convention - to which all the
SADCC members adhered - was also used to strengthen South Africa's
neighbours against the country's destabilisation policies. This attempt was,
however, partially hampered by the structure of the EPC, which made
collective policy formulation cumbersome.
The new CFSP is an attempt to address these and other weaknesses of the
EPC, including the "potentially immobilising effect of consensus policy
formulation, the reliance on Community instruments for an intergovernmental
procedure, and the reactive nature of past policy".29 To a certain extent
apartheid South Africa demonstrated through the years the inadequacies and
poor implementation of the past EPC policies; the new democratic
government of South Africa provided an opportunity to test the new CFSP of
the European Union. This partially explains why, without being classed as an
economic or strategic imperative, South Africa had been elevated to one of
the first five 'joint actions' of the EU. More interestingly, this also signalled the
EU's keen desire, as a regional organisation, to become a recognised
international actor. Or, as Martin Holland explains: "South Africa was both
topical and of international importance: politically, the Union could not ignore
becoming involved. 'Joint action' was appropriate, justified and demanded.f"
In addition, although the South African situation was extremely volatile, the
chances of a 'joint action' success in South Africa were most probable at the
time." South Africa had embarked on an irreversible road towards
democratisation. Although violence was condemned, it was also not
28 SADCC members: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Today SADC includes the previous SADCC countries plus
Namibia, South Africa, Mauritius, the Seychelles and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
29 Holland, M. 1994. Plus <;:achange ...? The European Joint Action and South Africa.
Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies No. 57. (page 4)
30 Ibid
31 According to the Presidency conclusions of October 1993 joint action towards South Africa
would include the economic and social foundations of this transition.
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completely unexpected in a country that was experiencing such a dynamic
change. It was felt that the incidence of violence was minimal within the
broader concept of complete political reversal in South Africa.'32
2.1.2 The European Union's Relationship of the 'New" South Africa
South Africa and the EU: Knock Knock! The two parties approach each
other about a long-term trade and co-operation agreement. The Economist, 24
December 1994.
The Union's 'joint action' towards South Africa was initially divided into three
phases, (as outlined in a Commission Paper of 29 September 1993):
The Paper proposed a distinction between actions to be taken
• once legislation for a Transitional Executive Council (TEC) was in place,
• once a TEC was established; and
• those actions to be adopted after the elections of 27 April 1994.33
During these phases all sanctions were finally removed; aid was increased
dramatically; support for the electoral process was given and support to
remove the remaining restrictions on South Africa in the World Bank and the
IMF programmes was pledged.
In terms of the future trade relations between the European Union and South
Africa the British government made the first tentative steps towards
formulating future policy. This was partially due to its historic ties with the
South African republic, but also the British government held the presidency of
the EU during 1993. It was in this year that the British government initiated a
study to determine the best possible future trade deal between the two
parties." The suggestion made by the British government was the
32Th is extract was previously published in Berteismann, T. 1998. South Africa and the EU:
Reaching Agreement. SAIIA Reports. Johannesburg.
33lbid. Pius ..
34 Goodison, P. 1998. Marginalisation of Integration? Implications for South Africa's Custom
Union Partners of the South Africa-European Union Trade Deal. Institute for Global Dialogue.
Johannesburg.
30
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
establishment of a trade and co-operation agreement, which should be based
on a free trade agreement and a window on the Lomé Convention in order to
take Southern African regional concerns into consideration.
During the second phase of the 'joint action', which started in December 1994,
the Commission was empowered to open discussions with the TEC on the
shape of a new bilateral trade and economic framework. However, the policy
made it clear that South Africa should not expect any special privileges, but
must realise that whatever agreement was concluded would have to be
compatible with obligations under GATI and other existing third country and
regional aqreernents."
This was later translated into an offer which envisaged South Africa as a
partial member of the Lomé Convention and a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
to cover all other aspects of the relationship which would not be addressed by
Lomé.
This proposal was brought to the TEC, but due to the fact that there was no
official negotiating forum for the future foreign policy of the democratic South
Africa, it was decided that such a decision would have to stand over until the
new government had opportunity to consider the offer and formulate a
response."
Goodison argues that 'whilst the British government was informally
canvassing opinion on the possibility of a FTA agreement with South Africa,
the European Commission in a January 1994 'Non-Paper' was outlining seven
possible options for future EU-SA trade relations, namely:
35 Ibid. Pius ..
36 It is interesting to note here that the new South African government initially opted not to
accept the 'British' offer and opted to pursue a closer association with the Lomé Convention.
Had the TEC accepted the EU offer in 1993, South Africa might have been spared years of
negotiation. It is further of note that the final agreement closely resembled the original offer
made by the British. However, the value of the experience of negotiating the deal with the EU
should not be underestimated.
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• most-favoured nation status (MFN)37;
• generalised system of preferences (GSP)38;
• a non-preferential agreement;
• a preferential agreement;
• FTA aqreement";
• Associate Lomé Convention mernbership'": or
• Full Lomé Convention membership.' 41
37 The Most Favoured Nation principle was developed within the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) after the second World War. With the establishment of the WTO,
MFN has become a WTO principle. According to this principle, any member-state of the
WTO is assured that its goods will enter the markets of all WTO members at rates of duty no
less favourable than those applied to similar products of any other country. The MFN
principle is designed to accelerate the pace of tariff reductions and trade growth throughout
the world as well as to avoid the creation of new preferential trade blocs protected by
discriminatory tariff barriers.
38The European Union offers a General System of Preferences to a number of developing
countries. The GSP is a system developed within UNCTAD to encourage the expansion of
manufactured and semi-manufactured exports from developing countries by making such
goods more competitive in developed country markets through tariff preferences. Each
industrialised nation determines its own system of preferences, specifying the goods that
would benefit from preferential treatment.
39 A Free Trade Area comes into existence when a group of two or more countries eliminate
tariff and most non-tariff barriers among themselves, while each participating country applies
its own independent schedule of tariffs to imports from countries that are not members. The
predecessor of the EU - the ECSC - constituted a FTA, the EU fifteen members collectively
now have FTAs with some other countries, including Israel, Tunisia, Morocco most recent
also with Egypt.
40 The Lomé Convention governs relations between 70 African, Caribbean and Pacific
countries, all former colonies of the members of the European Union. Most of these countries
are in Africa. Lomé evolved out of the earlier Yaounde Conventions. Founded in February
1975, the Lomé Convention has grown from an initial 46 member states into a 70 state-strong
instrument of North-South co-operation. Apart from receiving development aid from the EU,
the member states also enjoy preferential access to the European Union markets. The
Convention makes special provisions for the ACP countries in two areas, namely trade and
financial co-operation. Under trade it offers unrestricted, non-reciprocal, and duty-free access
for industrial products (including coal, steel, textiles, clothing); duty reductions; and
quantitative access for agricultural products. Under financial co-operation Lomé provides for
massive aid packages: currently Lomé offers more aid than all other states put together. Aid
is channelled through the European Development Fund (EDF) and the European Investment
Bank (EIB). Mayer, M. & Kritzinger-van Niekerk, L. 1997. Towards a South African Position
on the Lomé Convention. Paper presented at DBSA
41 Goodison, P. 1998. Marginalisation oflntegration? Implications for South Africa's Custom
Union Partners of the South Africa-European Union Trade Deal. Institute for Global Dialogue.
Johannesburg.
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From these discussion it became clear that these options were not mutually
exclusive and that a combination of some of these options were under
consideration. These discussions further created the impression that the EU
was willing to grant South Africa an adjustment period during which it would
not be obliged to open up its market to the European Union. South Africa
interpreted this to translate into access to the Lomé Convention for a limited
period - whereas by stark contrast - the EU intended this to mean an
extended implementation period.
Several days before the April 1994 elections, the Union announced in the
Luxembourg Declaratlon," that its General System of Preferences (GSP)
were to be granted to South Africa. (The Luxembourg Declaration has often
been referred to as the basis of the negotiations between South Africa and the
EU. It refers to the political, economic and possible trade aspects of a future
relationship.)
However, the extension of the GSP was not the only measure adopted to help
South Africa as an interim measure. A number of development and technical
support measures were also made available to Pretoria. This was then
already indicative that any future agreement would not only look at trade
liberalisation, but would include other measures to assist South Africa's fragile
economy.
2.2 South Africa's Position
In stark contrast to the organised and deliberated position of the European
Union, South Africa still found itself in an unstable and unclear situation.
Not many people appreciate the difficulties encountered in trade
negotiations when time is of the essence and one's own national policy
framework is not finalised. The new South Africa was forced to think
anew about almost every aspect of society and the economy. For
42 (18/19 April 1994, EU Press Release: 6294/94)
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example, the South African representatives could not enter a negotiating
session on controversial issues like competition policy, public
procurement, maritime transport or fisheries on the basis of existing
policy frameworks."
However, when the new South African government took over the reigns of the
country, attention needed to be paid to the future trade relationship with the
EU as a matter of urgency. In a move that signalled South Africa's preference
for the full membership of the Lomé Convention, Trevor Manuel - who had
just been appointed Minister of Trade and Industry - addressed the EU-ACP
Council of Ministers and declared South Africa's desire to become a Lomé
partner. It is important to note the words 'full Lomé membership' were never
expressed which is indicative of the fact that South Africa was aware of the
problems it could face in applying for full membership of the Convention.
In a subsequent move Pretoria commissioned a study to establish whether
there would be any real concerns on behalf of the ACP countries if it were to
join the Convention as a full partner.
[Pretoria] did, however, recognise ACP concerns over possible trade
diversions and contracted experts to analyse the possible trade
diversion effects of South African accession, with a view to establishing
special arrangements in areas where current ACP exports could be
adversely affected. This research revealed only limited dangers of
trade diversion away from ACP countries as a result of South African
accession to the trade provisions of the Lomé Convention."
43 Smalberger, W. 2000. Lessons learnt by South Africa during the Negotiations. In
Bertelsmann-Scott, T; Mills, G.; Sidiropoulos, E. The SA-EU Agreement: South Africa,
Southern Africa and the European Union. SAIIA. Johannesburg. pp48
44 Goodison, P 1998. Marginalisation of Integration? Implications for South Africa's Custom
Union Partners of the South Africa-European Union Trade Deal. Institute for Global Dialogue.
Johannesburg.
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South Africa received support in its endeavour for Lomé membership from the
European parliament. Quoting once again from the work of Paul Goodisorï",
The External Trade Committee of the European parliament, in its report
on 'South Africa's Future Relations With the European Union' argued
for the:
• Negotiation of a transitional arrangement granting on a non-
reciprocal basis market access equal or similar to that available
under Lomé, with full account being taken of genuine EU-ACP
concerns; and
• With the option of the commencement at the end of the five year
transitional period of the introduction of an asymmetrical FTA
agreement, which takes account of regional developments."
Despite the fact that the ACP countries and the European parliament were
mostly in favour of South Africa's accession to the Convention, it was quite
clear that full membership of Lomé was not really an option for South Africa.
The European Commission has the right to negotiate trade agreements with
third countries and could act contrary to parliament's suggestions.
The reasons offered were of an economic nature, arguing that South Africa's
economic situation is unique. All the participants in the Lomé Convention are
classified either as 'developing' or as 'least developed' nations. In contrast,
South Africa is classified as an 'economy in transition', making it neither
developed nor developing. Whereas South Africa is widely perceived to have
a dynamic economy, which is also the powerhouse of the Southern African
region, it exhibits a high degree of duality.
The South African economy displays: a relatively high GOP per capita,
but continues to exhibit large inequalities of income; a diversified
45 Ibid
46 As quoted in Goodison. Ibid. Quoted in South Africa's future Economic and Commercial
Relations with the European Union, Draft Report European Parliament, Committee on
External Relations, may 1995, PE 212 338/8 p15
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production base, but one that is still highly dependent on mining (50%
of export earnings); an infrastructure base better than any other country
in sub-Saharan Africa, but an industrial sector which is uncompetitive in
many areas after years of protection; and an acute shortage of skilled
labour alongside burgeoning unemployment."
Although the EU recognised the 'developing' nature of South Africa's
economy, it barely considered full participation in Lomé as an option for South
Africa, citing the country's economic sophistication in comparison to the other
ACP countries. It felt that, whereas the developing nature of South Africa
should be addressed within a framework of aid, its developed nature should
be accommodated in a reciprocal trade agreement.
The European Commission offered additional reasons for rejecting South
Africa's full Lomé participation, including:
• the effect it might have on the other ACP countries;
• the interests of other members of the WTO;
• protection for vulnerable EU sectors; and
• the promotion of South Africa's integration in the global economy."
In 1995, South Africa's exports to the EU were equivalent to more than a third
of total ACP exports and it was felt that South Africa would over-shadow other
ACP economies. In addition, other countries, currently on the same level of
development as South Africa, could (and would) rightly then demand access
to the Lomé Convention as well.
,
However, the main reasons seemed to be fears of South African competition
on the EU market. For the same reasons that 39% of South Africa's
agricultural products were initially excluded from the negotiations, the EU
47 European Commission. 1995. Commission launches a New Framework for EU-SA
Relations. in Port Parole. Press Release.
48 European Commission Directorate-General for Development. 1997. The European Union
and South Africa: Building a Framework for Long-Term Co-operation.
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feared South African Lomé participation: some South African products may
have a comparative advantage and could damage European profits if allowed
completely tariff-free onto the market.
By contrast, South Africa argued that only a small percentage of South
Africa's current and potential exports to the EU could provide competition to
the ACP. South Africa has only a very small agricultural export mix and the
EU should therefore have nothing to fear.
In a move which seemed at the time to be an effort to sway the European
Union and to strengthen its developing claim, South Africa strengthened its
ties with the Southern African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC), the members
of which all form part of Lomé. Pretoria identified the region as its priority,
aiming at co-ordinating trade policy with its neighbours. South Africa also
signed a Free Trade Protocol with SADC, which aims at removing tariff
barriers in the region within eight years of implementation. Equivalent levels of
access to the European market for both South Africa and other SADC states
would have facilitated this process". However, the European Union remained
adamant that only political participation in the Convention would be
considered for South Afrlca.'?
Little option was left to South Africa but to enter into negotiations with the
European Union regarding the establishment of an FTA. South Africa tried to
play down the importance of a trade deal with the European Union, stating
time and again that it considered other nations and trading blocs to be of
49 Much of the negotiations demonstrate that the negotiating position of the EU is
strengthened by its numbers: the EU repeatedly stated that they cannot deviate from their
negotiating mandate, as the document had been drawn up by the 15 member countries; any
deviation would have had to be re-discussed and re-negotiated with all the members.
Although South Africa could not achieve full SADC integration within a couple of months, they
had hoped that the Trade Protocol would have strengthened their position significantly in a
similar way. However, South Africa found unwilling partners in SADC, that remain suspicious
to date about integration and liberalisation.
50 This extract was previously published in Bertelsmann, T. 1998. South Africa and the EU:
Reaching Agreement. SAIIA Reports. Johannesburg.
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equal importance to democratic South Africa. As Rob Davies commented on
the conclusion of an agreement between the two parties,
The EU was, however, not seen either as the only, or as the most
important partner with whom to develop new trade relations. The EU
was in 1994, and still is, South Africa's largest trading partner if exports
and imports are added together, but neighbouring SADC countries,
were, and still are, the country's largest export market. Promoting
equitable and mutually beneficial co-operation and integration in the
southern African region continues to be seen as the top priority. South
Africa's democratic government is also aware of the importance of
building new trade and co-operation relations with other countries and
regions, particularly those with which apartheid limited or prevented
such relations."
However, in reality South Africa had to reach some sort of an agreement with
the EU to better the meagre benefits it received from the GSP. This was
important in order to support government's GEAR strategy that focuses on
export led growth.
Since the EU did not view South Africa as a typical developing country,
it was not willing to grant South Africa non-reciprocal access to its
markets in terms of the Lomé Convention. South Africa therefore was
left with the only alternative, namely to accept the EU invitation to
negotiate a comprehensive and long-term relationship. As a result,
then Deputy President Mbeki requested the EU to open negotiations
'with a view to establishing the closest possible relationship with the
Lomé Convention. ,52
51 Davies, R. 2000. Forging a New Relationship with the EU in Bertelsmann-Scott, T; Mills, G
& Sidiropoulos, E. The EU-SA Agreement: South Africa, Southern Africa and the European
Union. SAIlA, Johannesburg. pp5-6
52 Links, E. 2000. Negotiating a Long- Term Relationship. in Bertelsmann-Scott, T; Mills, G &
Sidiropoulos, E. The EU-SA Agreement: South Africa, Southern Africa and the European
Union. SAIIA, Johannesburg.pp31-32
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CHAPTER THREE: THE AGREEMENT
3.1 Getting into the Swing of Things ...
In March 1995 the European draft mandate for negotiation was approved by
the Commission, which will be discussed below. This draft was endorsed by
the EU Council a couple of months later, but it was still unclear what the
details of Europe's vision were.
And yet, Europe sought an agreement in principle from South Africa that the
agreement concluded would be an FTA! Clearly South Africa had substantial
difficulty in agreeing to an unclear mandate, but eventually - given the
awkward position it found itself in - gave in to the European demand with the
opt-out that 'nothing was agreed until everything was agreed.'
EU row looms over SA free trade: France and Germany are accused of undermining
the EU's promises to support the development of a multiracial democracy in South
Africa by refusing to accede to negotiations on an FTA. The Citizen, 26 February 1996.
It would take the European Union another year to add substance to their
mandate, as this process included broad consultation amongst member states
that were not all in favour of reaching a trade deal with South Africa53.
However, by March 1996 the European mandate was finalised. A staggering
24 gruelling rounds of negotiation and countless informal meetings were to
follow. However, from the start a number of guiding principles were implicitly
agreed to.
From the outset, the negotiators agreed that their deliberations should
be guided by, among others, three principles - namely that the
agreement be WTO compatible; that it be to the benefit of the whole of
53 A number of EU members, led by France, insisted on a detailed impact study before they
would consider passing the draft mandate. Business Day 29 January 1996, Concern over SA
trade deal setback.
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the southern African region; and that it be developmental in nature,
meaning asymmetrical. 54
The EU added another two in their negotiating directives, including respect
for EU common policies and coherence with other preferential agreements.
This meant that the EU would not be forced to make any concession to South
Africa regarding the Union's agricultural or fishing policies and that it would
not treat South Africa any more beneficially than its ACP or Mediterranean
partners. This left little room for manoeuvre for the South Africans. Apart
from these guiding principles, the very nature of the European Union, its
bureaucracy, the way decision is reached within the various bodies and the
vested interests of the various member states were difficult to negotiate
around.
Throughout the negotiations the EU has claimed the nature of its negotiating
mandate to be unchangeable. Any major deviations from their mandate would
have to be referred back to the 15 member states, a process that could prove
very time-consuming. For this reason the final agreement resembled the
European mandate, especially in format.
The structure of the European mandate - and the final agreement - on a
long-term trade and co-operation agreement can most easily be understood if
it is seen to be resting on three pillars. They are:
1. several agreements on co-operation in a number of fields: science and
technology, wine and spirits, and fisheries;
2. South Africa's partial accession to the Lomé Convention; and
3. a Trade and Co-operation agreement to cover all' aspects of the
relationship not addressed in Lomé.
A more detailed analysis of this proposal follows.
54 Links, E. 2000. Negotiating a Long- Term Relationship. In Bertelsmann-Scott, T; Mills, G &
Sideropoulos, E. 2000. The SA-EU Agreement: South Africa, Southern Africa and the
European Union. SAIIA. Johannesburg.pp32
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3.2 The Co-operation Agreements
Apart from negotiating the liberalisation of tariffs for all products traded
between the two parties, the EU suggested a number of co-operation
agreements in the fields of science and technology, wines and spirits and the
fishing industry. These agreements have nothing to do with tariff
liberalisation, but rather with technology transfer, technical standards and in
the case of the fishing agreement access to fishing waters. These
agreements would prove the thorn in the side of the negotiations, except for
the Co-operation agreement on Science and Technology that was concluded
and implemented swiftly.
3.2.1 The Agreement on Science and Technology Co-operation
On 5 December 1996, the first mutual co-operation agreement between the
two parties was signed. The agreement provides for scientific and
technological co-operation between South Africa, the European Community
and its member states. A joint Science and Technology Co-operation
Committee will be established in order to administer the agreement. In South
Africa, the Department of Arts, Science and Technology, in conjunction with
the Department of Finance, is responsible for the implementation of the
agreement.
Within the Fourth Framework Programme adopted by the European
Parliament, South Africa has been classified as a 'developing country', which
will enable it to benefit greatly from the modalities of the programme,
including:
• visits and exchanges of research workers, engineers and technicians;
• participation by experts in seminars, symposia and workshops;
• scientific networks and training researchers; and
• exchange of information on practices and programmes.
41
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
As a 'developing country', the programme encourages South Africa to initially
target three areas, namely sustainable management of renewable natural
resources, sustainable improvement of agricultural and agro-industrial
production, and health.55
3.2.2 The Wine and Spirits Agreement
Port, sherry debate most serious threat to trade pact: The EU's demand that SA
should phase out the use if terms 'port' and 'sherry' in the internal market has emerged
as the most serious threat to concluding the EU-SA FTA before year-end. Business
Day, 4 December 1998.
Towards the end of the negotiations the separate co-operation agreement in
wine and spirits proved to be one of the major stumbling blocs in reaching a
deal. A number of constituencies in Europe wanted South Africa to phase out
the usage of the naming of 'port' and 'sherry' of South Africa's fortified wines.
They argued that these terms refer to geographical locations in Portugal and
Spain and should, therefore, be used exclusively by these two countries.
South African producers have, however, used the names for generations.
It took a number of meetings between the two chief negotiators to come to a
compromise on the highly publicised issue. A political compromise was
eventually reached in January at Davos. Minister Erwin agreed to phase out
the use of names of port and sherry in exports to third countries. South Africa
will, however, be allowed to continue to use these terms on its domestic
market throughout the transitional period of 12 years. After this period the use
of these names would be reviewed. In return for these concessions,
Commissioner Pinheiro agreed to grant the wine sector duty-free quotas for
exports to the EU market and financial assistance for the restructuring of the
industry.
The EU ministers, however, could still not accept the agreement and referred
it back for discussion. Although Minister Erwin initially insisted that the Davos
55 Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology. Press release.
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agreement was South Africa's final offer, he eventually accepted a slightly
watered down version. The adjustment period was lowered to 10 years and
greater commitment to phasing out these terms was given.56
3.2.3 The Fisheries Agreement
In addition to the wine and spirit agreement causing extreme difficulties in
concluding a deal, the fishing agreement proved to be another major obstacle.
The Spanish government is seeking access to South Africa's fishing waters. It,
however, seeks the access without any commitments. In other words, it
would like to fish and then take the fish right back to Spain to be processed.
South Africa, by contrast, is only willing to grant the access if it will be to the
mutual benefit of both parties. Under these terms South Africa would grant
Spain access to fish in its waters, but would insist on Spain docking the fish
on South African soil for processing before being exported to Spain. This
would lead to employment opportunities for South Africans and the transfer of
technology. In addition, South Africa would have greater control over how
much Spain would fish. Currently South Africa does not have the necessary
patrolling vessels or legislation in place in order to prevent over-fishing.
In a political effort to conclude the talks, agreement was reached in December
1998 that both parties would endeavour to negotiate and conclude a co-
operation agreement in the fishing sector no later than the end of the year
2000. Until such time the EU will hold back on tariff concessions for South
African fish exports. South Africa in turn will abolish its tariffs on fisheries
products only in parallel with the EU.57
56 This extract was previously published in Bertelsmann-ScoU, T. The European Union, South
Africa and the Free Trade Agreement. In SAIIA. 1999/2000The South Africa Yearbook of
International Affairs. Johannesburg.
57 Ibid.
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3.3 Accession to the Lomé Convention
Through the European mandate South Africa's bid for full Lomé membership
was finally put to rest.
However, partially due to South Africa's persistent request for full Lomé
participation and partially due to the fact that South Africa was calling on
transitional benefits until the FTA negotiations were concluded, the Lomé
negotiations were de-linked from the overall trade and co-operation talks. (It
was envisaged that the
three parts of the
wouldagreement
concluded
simultaneously, however,
this proved impossible
given the different
timeframes and different
levels of sensitivity of the
issues.) This would seem
contrary to South Africa's
initial stance of 'nothing is
agreed until everything is
agreed', however, this
proved to be restricted to
the FTA negotiations.
be
THE AGREEMENT
South Africa's accession to the Lomé Convention
remains effectively a political accession rather than
an economic one. The main economic benefit will be
the ability to tender for European Development Fund
(EDF) projects in all ACP countries, which could have
important economic benefits for South Africa and the
region as a whole, enabling these countries to tender
for contracts worth R45 billion. In addition, South
Africa will benefit from the cumulation of origin
clause. South Africa will further participate in Lomé
projects on technical, cultural and social co-operation,
regional co-operation, industrial development, and
investment promotion and protection. It will not,
however, be eligible for non-reciprocal trade benefits
and will receive development aid separately from the
Lomé Convention. (It is interesting to note that South
Africa currently receives more development aid than
any of the Lomé countries through the European
Program for Reconstruction and Development. South
Africa will be receiving R1236,75 million in the year
1998/1999.) The special protocols on bananas, rum,
beef and veal, sugar, and coal and steel products will
also not be aoolicable to South Africa.
The de-linking fell outside of the European mandate, which created the
impression that the mandate was not cast in stone. It remained, however, a
minor concession by Europe. After de-linking, South Africa's accession was
finalised swiftly, despite protest from Spain, which feared South Africa would
abandon the FTA negotiations after having achieved its main goal, Lomé.
South Africa's accession to the Lomé Convention was ratified at a joint ACP-
EU ministerial conference on 24 April 1997.
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Spanish spanner in SA works: Spain warns that it will bloc SA's accession to
the Lomé Convention if Spanish fishing boats are not granted access to South
African waters. Business Report, 25 February 1997.
The form which South Africa's accession to Lomé eventually took, was exactly
as originally proposed within the European mandate, except for the de-linking
from the overall talks. The finalisation of the Lomé issue could therefore even
be seen as a negotiating defeat for South Africa: it gained nothing more than it
had been offered and it no longer had a bargaining chip on the table to give
up during the trade negotiations. (However, in hindsight, it seemed the right
thing to do as South Africa now as had a number of years of access to the
Convention whilst the FTA talks were dragging on.)
A hiccup occurred with South Africa's final participation in Lomé, when the
South African parliament indicated that it would refuse to ratify South Africa's
Lomé accession unless Europe reviews the basis on which South Africa may
participate in the 'cumulation of origin' clause.
According to the agreement on South Africa's partial accession to the
convention South Africa could cumulate origin on an ad hoc basis. As
members of the Lomé Convention, ACP countries "can co-produce
manufactured goods with specified countries and still benefit from preferential
access to the EU market"," usually paying no import tariffs. With its partial
entry into Lomé, South Africa should have become one of these specified
countries. However, allowing South Africa to only participate in the
cumulation of origin on an ad hoc basis, would mean that each Lomé product
with a South African input would first have to be screened by .the EU, allowing
Brussels to protect its own sensitive products. This would discourage any
cumulation efforts within the SADC region which, in turn, impact negatively on
regional integration and co-operation. The situation was settled when
parliament received guarantee that the exact details of South Africa's
cumulation rights would be finalised in the FTA negotiations.
58 Linda Loxton. 3 September 1997. SA Upset by Lomé Clause. in Business Report, the
Star.
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3.4 South Africa: an Example for a Future Lomé Dispensation?
At the time it was felt that this partial, political accession of South Africa was
an important indication on the future of the Lomé Convention. Considering
that the EU saw the need to change Lomé due to its WTO incompatibility
regarding the exclusivity of the Convention's members and the non-reciprocal
nature of the relationship, South Africa's partial membership was seen as an
example of how to counter these problems. Although this was always refuted
by the EU, the SA-EU TDCA could not be but indicative of the things to come
for the ACP.
In its Green Paper on the future of Lomé, the EU indicated that it would like to
create regional free trade areas with the ACP countries, instead of continuing
with current tariff preferences and aid programmes. The fact that the EU
wanted to create an FTA with South Africa and at the same time continue with
development aid illuminated the new thinking within the Commission.
These developments were met with a certain amount of criticism, especially
given the time it has taken to negotiate the SA-EU TDCA. If South Africa, with
a well established and skilled civil service, had such difficulty in concluding a
deal with the EU, the ACP-EU negotiations would either take years or the
ACP would be bullied into an agreement they simply did not have the human
resources to oppose.
South Africa's example, however, made it clear that certain amount of
difficulties existed in the EU's proposal for the future of the Lomé Convention.
The EU has proposed that the old agreement of non-reciprocal, beneficial
access to the EU market for ACP countries make way for an arrangement
resembling free trade agreements, which have been called Regional
Economic Partnership Agreements (REPA). Clearly some of the ACP
countries have difficulties in accepting the proposal, as they are classified as
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least developed countries and would struggle to adjust their economies to
compete on an equal basis with European products. However, alternative
suggestions are hard to come by, as the preferences that the Convention
currently grants are considered violations of the WTO rules.
Here there is a stark contrast between the SA-EU TOCA and the REPA's
suggested to the ACP: South Africa is a single country that negotiated a free
trade agreement with a regional organisation. In the REPA's regions in the
ACP (as yet undetermined) would have negotiate with another region, which
would clearly be very time consuming.
The EU suggests that these would, however, not be classic free trade
agreements, as they would include economic co-operation in a number of
fields. 'Optimists stress that these REPAs would bring prices down in the ACP
- benefiting consumers and importers - foster trade and other economic
reforms, and make the economic environment more conducive to domestic
and foreign investment. REPA sceptics fear that they would lead to the
closure of many companies in ACP countries. They also suggest that
unemployment would rise and revenues from import duties would fall.'59
The ACP's greatest concern is that their members are not clearly organised
into regional organisations. In the Pacific Islands there is no regional body
and on the African continent there are so many overlapping organisations that
it would be difficult to identify a single permanent structure.
Even where a number of ACP countries might have regional integration
schemes they might not be aiming at a customs union, which would be a
prerequisite for a REPA. In addition, most regions consist of both developing
and least developed countries. At this point it is not foreseen that the least
developed will be included in the REPAs, which makes the feasibility of these
agreements questionable.
59 ECDPM. 1999. The EC's Impact Studies on Regional Economic Partnership Agreements.
(Lomé Negotiating Brief No.5). Maastricht: ECDPM.
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The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a case in point.
South Africa is classified by the EU as an 'economy in transition', whereas its
immediate neighbours in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) are
classified as 'developing' and as 'least developed' countries. South Africa -
and therefore potentially SACU- has reached a separate agreement with the
EU. If the least developed countries of SADC were excluded from the REPA,
it would leave only Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mauritius and the Seychelles to reach
agreement with Europe.
As pointed out above, the Lomé Convention does not cover only the trade
aspect of the relationship between the EU and the ACP. Doubts remain over
the future of the aid that the EU has previously given the Aep. Since the end
of colonialism European states have been contributing to the development of
previous colonies and other developing countries. However, over the years
only a small number of countries have been able to employ the large sums of
money in favour of development. Too many corrupt officials, unfeasible
projects and other factors have resulted in the perception that aid is used only
to keep strongmen in place and palace. The restructuring of aid packages is
therefore also proposed. In this context it is interesting to note that South
African development aid from the EU is also being kept separate from the
general free trade agreement, which will leave considerable room for the EU
to change the nature and extent of aid given to South Africa.
The EU has also suggested good governance clauses for the future Lomé
agreements. During the South African negotiations the European Union
,
wanted to include a clause in the agreement that would allow for the
discontinuation of the agreement in the event of South Africa violating the
respect for democratic principles, fundamental human rights, the rule of law
and good governance. The European Union traditionally includes the first
three conditions in any agreement it concludes. This has led to the collapse of
a number of trade talks that the EU has been involved in. Most recently, the
EU failed to reach agreement with Australia, as these clauses were found
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unacceptable. The inclusion of a 'good governance' clause is however a new
stipulation, which is clearly aimed at the future Lomé negotiations.
South Africa, however, took exception to the inclusion of this clause, as it
feared that this would lead to the unilateral definition of these concepts by the
EU. In addition, it feared setting a precedent for the Lomé negotiations that
could impact negatively on its partners in the region. Although all four clauses
were in the end included on the deal, the agreement allows for consultation
before suspension, in the event of the violation of these principles by any of
the two parties."
In the end, the main advantage gained for the ACP from the SA-EU
negotiations, is experience on the part of South Africa. Ambassador Links
commented,
During the negotiating process, Pretoria learnt much about the
international trading system and the intricacies of trade negotiations,
and hopes to be able to share lessons learnt with the ACP states in an
endeavour to assist developing countries in overcoming some of the
inherent difficulties in negotiations with a large and economically
powerful group of states such as the EU.51
60 This section was previously published in Berteismann-Scott, T; Mills, G & Gibb, R. 2000
The EU-SA Agreement in a Global Context.. In Bertelsmann-Scott, T; Mills, G &
Sidiropoulos, E. 2000. The SA-EU Agreement: South Africa, Southern Africa and the
European Union. SAil A. Johannesburg.
61 Links, E. 2000. Negotiating a Long- Term Relationship. In Bertelsmann-Scott, T; Mills, G &
Sidiropoulos, E. 2000. The SA-EU Agreement: South Africa, Southern Africa and the
European Union. SAIIA. Johannesburg.pp34
49
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.5 Free Trade Agreement
2.5.1 South Africa's Mandate
The third pillar of the agreement, is the Free Trade Agreement. Faizel Ismail,
former Chief Director of
THE AGREEMENT
Foreign Trade Relations in
South Africa's DTI, once said
that the South African
negotiators are "diplomats in
The free trade agreement itself has several
components, consisting of:
• political dialogue;
• provisions for a free trade area;
• trade-related issues; the service of development".
• economic co-operation; This approach laid the
• financial assistance and development co- foundations for the South
operation; and African negotiating mandate.
• social and cultural co-operation.
South Africa took an equally
long time to finalise its negotiating mandate, as it embark on an extensive
process of consultation within government departments, institutions and civil
society. (This process will be discussed in more detail in the second section.)
SA-EU diplomatie tiff puts free trade agreement at risk: The EU and South Africa
clash over delays to a free trade agreement, and it appears that such a deal is now at
risk. South Africa is accused of hesitancy in formulating a position for imminent talks
between the two parties. Business Day, 19 June 1996.
Suffice to say that the South African government proposed a Trade and
Development (TOA) agreement instead of the straightforward free trade area
as proposed by the EU. It was not initially clear how development issues
could be addressed in a trade agreement that traditionally exclusively focuses
on the liberalisation of tariffs. However, the South African mandate focused on
a strategy for sustainable development in South Africa and the region and
proposed an asymmetrical phasing in period in both content and time.
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3.5.2 Points of Contention During the Negotiations
The negotiations surrounding the FTA would take a number of years to
conclude and were characterised by postponed deadlines, threats to pull out
of the talks and a general feeling that the agreement would take considerable
time to conclude. The main contentious issues during the negotiations tended
to focus on the limited scope of the European mandate. South Africa was
expecting more favourable treatment and greater coverage for its products to
enter the EU market duty free.
3.5.2.1 Agriculture
One of South Africa's largest concerns was the paltry coverage agricultural
products were given in the European mandate. The European Commission
proposal for the agricultural sector envisaged the elimination of duties on 95%
of all EU agricultural exports to South Africa within 10 years, whilst allowing
the elimination of duties on only approximately 55% of South African
agricultural exports to the EU.
Apart from excluding sensitive products from the FTA, South Africa's
agricultural gains from the agreement are further frustrated by the EU's
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP has come under serious
criticism by various countries throughout the world and not least by its own
members.
The policy, formulated in the 1950s and in full operation since 1969, aims at
uplifting farmers in Europe to a status equal to industrfal workers and
protecting them from an increasingly competitive world market. The initial
objectives of the CAP were laid down in the Treaty of Rome. They included
five aims:
• to raise agricultural productivity;
• to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community;
• to stabilise markets;
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• to assure availability of supplies; and
• to ensure that supplies reached consumers at reasonable prices.
THE AGREEMENT
South Africa will be eligible for compensation in
the event of EU changes to its agricultural policy
that could adversely affect the balance of
concessions made in the trade agreement. In
addition, South Africa will have the right to
challenge the EU should there be proof that
increased imports of agricultural products are
causing harm or threatening to cause harm to the
domestic industry. South Africa further managed
to increase the coverage of duty-free South Africa
agricultural exports to the EU from the suggested
54% to 61%. The introduction of tariff quotas
effectively means that only 27% of South Africa's
agricultural products are completely excluded
from the deal.
The policy may be
criticised in many aspects,
but its main failure
arguably has been in
establishing reasonable
prices. Most products on
the European market can
be bought at a much lower
price on the world market.
However, European
consumers are forced to pay increased prices in order to sustain the living
standard and commercial viability of the farmer.62
New GATT rules oblige the European Union to dismantle the Common
Agricultural Policy by some 30%. However, due to pressure from agricultural
lobbies within the EU, cuts made to agricultural aid are replaced by social
subsidies. This effectively means that the European farmer feels no real cuts
in aid. Farmers building blockades in the streets of Paris show just how
remarkably strong the agricultural lobby still is in European politics: the list of
exclusions is a direct result of the power it wields.
Breakthrough in SA-EU trade talks: Negotiators made a significant breakthrough in a
final round of free trade talks on Friday, agreeing on improved terms of access for South
Africa's agricultural exports to the EU. Business Day, 23 November 1998.
During the talks South Africa managed to increase the coverage of agricultural
products substantially - 61% of agricultural imports from South Africa will be
62 Harrop J, Political Economy of Integration in the European Community. Edward Elgar
Publishing Limited, 1993. pp 64-85
52
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
treated duty-free after the number of implementation years - which should be
seen as a negotiating victory for South Africa.
At the conclusion of the talks, Ambassador Links commented in the following
way on the agricultural side of the agreement,
While both sides have found the negotiations tough and complex, it
must be remembered that this is the first FTA reached by the EU since
the conclusion of the Marrakech Agreement. South Africa has had to
make a huge effort to reposition its economy, to revisit its tariff
structures and to meet its WTO commitments. For the EU it is also the
first FTA negotiation which included agricultural products, an area of
traditional sensitivity for the EU. Seen against this background, the
Agreement is indeed a remarkable achievernent.f
3.5.2.2 Timeframe
Another area where South Africa managed to score certain victory was in the
implementation period of the THE AGREEMENT
agreement. According to WTO Most South African companies will be
rules, a Free Trade Agreement is allowed 12 years to adjust to the
agreement, whereas automobiles and
parts will remain on a reserve list without
any tariff elimination or reduction for the
foreseeable future. Sensitive products in
textiles and clothing will be given eight
years to liberalise to around a 20% tariff.
suggested by the EU. The period By the end of the 12-year period, these
tariffs will be further reduced to a level
can, however, be extended by where the EU would enjoy better access
than the MFN tariff as stipulated by the
WTO.
allowed to contain an asymmetrical
adjustment period of 10 years -
which was the timeframe
another 2 years for products of
extreme sensitivity. South Africa
proposed that all products be included in an FTA with an adjustment period of
12 years. Although South Africa did not quite manage to secure 12 years for
63 Links, E. 2000. Negotiating a Long- Term Relationship. In Bertelsmann-Scott, T; Mills, G
& Sidiropoulos, E. 2000. The SA-EU Agreement: South Africa, Southern Africa and the
European Union. SAIIA. Johannesburg.pp34
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all products, it did manage secure this timeframe for a number of sensitive
South African products.
3.5.2.3 The Negative Impact on SAOG and SAGU
The negative impact which the Free Trade Agreement might have on SADC
and SACU received attention by the South African and European negotiators
alike. South Africa is aware that without an economically stable
neighbourhood, Southern Africa will not be able to develop adequately. As it
is often said, 'South Africa can not afford to be an island of prosperity in a sea
of poverty.' However, African refugees, illegal immigrants, a continent that
seems to remain in political turmoil and a massive trade imbalance are real
worries to South Africa. It could not afford a deal with Europe, which according
to all estimations would initially have had a negative impact on itself and a far
worse effect on the region. Such an economic setback to the region would
only further increase the problems currently experienced by South Africa.
These problems could not be addressed in one agreement or one
relationship.
South Africa had to take a multi-faceted approach to its trade relations with
the world and the region. In order to harmonise trade it is currently
implementing a Free Trade Agreement with the region, renegotiating the
SACU formula and participating, although only partially, in the Lomé
Convention. To increase its participation in the global market and to develop
a tariff regime attractive to Foreign Direct Investment, South Africa negotiated
a trade agreement with Europe, and is participating as a full member of the
World Trade Orqanisation." With this approach it is hoped that most
development issues of the region can be addressed, whilst it leaves room for
South Africa to become an active player in the global economy. The lengthy
nature of the EU-SA negotiations can partially be explained by this approach.
Although these negotiations did not have to follow one another, they have had
to proceed concurrently.
64 Currently South Africa is still ahead of GATT obligations on tariff reduction.
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3.5.2.3.1 The Impact on the Southern African Development Community
Given their intent on achieving political liberation, political stability has for
years been the focus of Southern African regional organisations. The
transformation of the Southern African Development Co-ordination
Conference (SADCC) into the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) in August 1992 heralded, a new era for the regional body. Political
stability of a sort had been achieved in most member states and the focus
shifted to developing those member countries stricken by war, poverty and
natural disasters over the past few decades. The Community was also
strengthened by the accession of South Africa in 1994 and by Mauritius the
following year. SADC was also joined, perhaps controversially, by the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Seychelles.
THE AGREEMENT
In the implementation of the FTA, special
attention will be given to providing support to the
adjustment efforts required by the region.
Safeguard measures in the Agreement can be
used to protect South Africa's neighbours'
industries, which will come under pressure during
the implementation phase. Review clauses will
also enable both parties to the Agreement to
assess the implications of the tariff liberalisation.
Regional co-operation will be promoted by
allowing South African exports with inputs from
the region to benefit from preferential treatment
in the EU.
September 2000.
Since its inception, SADC
has had a number of
successes in the area of
political co-ordination, and it
is hoped that it might be the
first African regional
organisation to achieve
some permanency. In order
for this to be achieved,
SADC is attempting to
harmonise economic and
trade policythrough a Free
Trade Area, which was
implemented on 1
Tariff liberalisation has generally been accepted in South Africa as a difficult
but necessary measure to encourage economic development and prosperity.
The rest of SADC is, however, not entirely convinced. Whereas most
bb
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participants in regional organisations view regional bodies as necessary and
auxiliary steps toward participation and competitiveness on the world market,
most members of SAOG look towards the SAOG itself for protection from
global movements. For this reason, South Africa has opted to open its market
up to SAOG products without having clear commitment from its SAOG
partners on how they will be reciprocating. The details of the reciprocation will
only be determined during the next couple of years.
Southern Africa fears that the fragile industries in the region will suffer due to
the SA-EU TOGA. Border controls are weak, so cheap European products can
filter through to SAOG countries. In addition, South Africa could 'steal' some
Foreign Direct Investment away from the SAOG countries: with its stronger
and more stable economy, South Africa became even more attractive with
implementation of the TOGA.
South Africa therefore pressured the European Union to provide a guarantee
that the region will not suffer. As no guarantees can be given in the agreement
itself - the real effects of an FTA are difficult to predict - South Africa would
have liked the EU to set up a fund to compensate SAOG workers for job
losses and to provide investment where businesses are closed. However, it
was agreed that traditional safeguard measures would be the only ones
adopted to protect SAOG businesses.
Despite these considerable concerns that SAOG should have had, it was
conspicuous by its absence. Little effort was done to lobby either South Africa
or the European Union. The impression was, therefore, created that either it
was only South Africa that was aware of the potential threats' of the agreement
to the region, or that Pretoria was over emphasising the effect to gain more
concession for itself from the EU.
The EU frequently stated that it shared South Africa's vision that the region
should be considered in the negotiations, however, it was difficult to translate
this vision into concrete measure to assist the Southern African region. Philip
Lowe, chief EU negotiator, explained how the agreement has been designed
bo
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to assist the region to develop economically without the assistance of
additional aid:
One of the areas where the EC tried its best to ensure a positive
regional impact is over the question of rules of origin. Here we have
been very successful: diagonal cumulation has been granted for inputs
coming from any of the ACP countries, and full cumulation is allowed
with the BLNS, in view of the strong degree of economic integration
and customs co-operationwhich already exists in SACU.65
3.5.2.3.2 The Impact on the Southern African Customs Union
EU deal may cost SA's neighbours billions: The SA-EU TDCA may cost SACU
partners as much as R3.5 billion in revenue losses a year. Financial Mail, 22 April 1999.
The Southern African Customs Union, which comprises South Africa,
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, is one of the oldest custom
unions in the world. Under SACU, as negotiated in 1969, South Africa
administers duty collection and distributes shares of the common revenue
pool to the other four countries according to a revenue sharing formula. More
than 46% of Swaziland's national budget in the fiscal year of 1994/1995, and
more than 50% of Lesotho's budget and 24% of Namibia's was derived from
the SACU revenue pool.
In a trading world where tariff reductions and free markets are at the order of
the day, fiscal dependence on a customs union is no longer viable. Each
SACU member agrees that the present agreement has certain shortcomings,
but instead of abandoning the union completely, the BLNS countries want a
revised formula to be phased in so as to avoid a precipitous fall in their
income. In December 1994 the revision process was initiated, but due to the
lack of consensus, there is still no new deal in place. Although there seems to
65 Lowe, P. 2000. Main Parameters of the EU-SA Agreement. 2000. In Bertelsmann-Scott, T;
Mills, G & Sidiropoulos, E. 2000. The SA-EU Agreement: South Africa, Southern Africa and
the European Union. SAil A. Johannesburg.pp44
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be agreement on a new revenue-sharing formula there is still no clarity on a
new set of institutions and policies to underpin the formula; and although it is
accepted that the BLNS should receive compensation from South Africa for
effects of industrial polarisation and fiscal disruption, the scale of the
compensation has not yet been agreed upon.
Under a Free Trade Agreement between South African and the European
Union, the BLNS countries not only stand to lose fiscal income due to a
diminishing tariff income, but unemployment is also likely to rise. With a
smaller revenue pool, fragile industries may be destroyed and infrastructural
development will be curtailed. The SACU countries will have to compete with
European agricultural and manufactured products which, after the
implementation period, would arrive duty free in the Customs Union. It is
expected that the BLNSwill be unable to compete. Losses incurred will not be
adequately replaced by aid from Europe, as prospective losses will be eight to
ten times the amount of European aid previously granted to the SACU
countries.
Due to the free trade nature of the customs union, all trade deals involving
South Africa should in fact be concluded with SACU as a whole, but this has
proved too much for SACU to handle. Had they become co-negotiators,
several of their industries would have been qualified as most sensitive and
would possibly have been excluded from an FTA. Such exclusions would
have resulted in high transaction costs, for example for policing to ensure that
goods imported by South Africa from the EU did not percolate across their
borders without having paid the full customs duties.66
There are very few options available to SACU to replace lost income from the
SA-EU TOCA. Alternative taxes could prove fatal to investment incentives.
Such taxes would have to be simple, fair and based on the ability to pay.
Looking to South Africa for compensation would prove fruitless. South Africa,
66 This extract was previously published in Bertelsmann, T. 1998. South Africa and the
European Union: Reaching Agreement? SAIIA Reports. Johannesburg.
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with its dedication to its own budgetary constraints, will most certainly not be
willing to pour further taxes into the common revenue pool."
SA' objectives met in trade pact with the EU: The significance of SA's trade pact
with the EU should be seen in a global context. Business Day, 13 October 1999.
The conclusion of the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement
between the EU and South Africa, unfortunately ended on the sour notes of
the 'port' and 'sherry' disputes, but all involved were relieved that the years
and years of negotiation has finally born fruit.
Ambassador Links expressed his relief in the following way:
It is in the nature of any negotiation process that there has to be
compromise. This was also the case during our negotiations with the
EU, but I believe that the Agreement will be beneficial for South Africa,
the southern African region and the EU. Firstly, the agreement
elevates the existing relationship to a higher level and provides South
Africa with a formalised relationship with the world's biggest trading
bloc. This places South Africa in a special and privileged relationship
with the EU when compared to many other countries. The political
significance of this Agreement and of South Africa's accession to the
ACP Group of States should also not be underestimated. Just as the
EU is playing an increasingly prominent role in the international
community via its Common Foreign and Security Policy, so South
Africa has become a significant influence on some aspects of the
agenda facing the international community. It confirms South Africa's
position as a credible player on the global stage.68
67 Maasdorp, G. "South Africa's Regional Trade Agreements" in US- South African Economic
Yearbook, 1996.
68 Links, E. 2000. Negotiating a Long- Term Relationship. In Bertelsmann-Scott, T; Mills, G &
Sidiropoulos, E. 2000. The SA-EU Agreement: South Africa, Southern Africa and the
European Union. SAil A. Johannesburg.pp35-36
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CHAPTER 4: THE SA-EU NEGOTIATIONS
Regardless of whether South Africa was (and still is) democratising its foreign
policy and foreign trade policy due to international pressure or due to an
understanding that these processes are key to the stability of the young
democracy, it was (and still remains) a long process towards the
democratisation of these two policy formulations. Not only would a broad
base of government institutions and departments, parliament and civil society
need to be involved in this process, but all these institutions needed to be
democratised in their own right.
For the purpose of this study I would like to identify four key elements of a
democracy and look at how they translate into actors in democratic policy
formulation. These elements are participation, representation, transparency
and openness. Although the borders between these are blurred, we can
understand these four to translate into parliament, government, a transparent
bureaucracy and the access ordinary citizens have to policy formulation.
4.1 Parliament
4. 1. 1 The Democratisation of the South African Parliament
During the apartheid years parliament did not playa significant role in.foreign
policy or foreign trade policy formulation - this was more or less left to the
executive. With the change to a democratic government, parliament was also
given a greater in role in foreign policy formulation. As Van Wyk points out,
'Until recently it was considered that foreign policy decision-making
was not a concern of Parliament, but rather the preserve of the
Executive. [ ... ] In contrast with the practice of the Nationalist
government, the current parliament has taken important steps to
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ensure greater transparency and accountability of various ministries,
including Foreign Affairs.,69
However, the democratisation of parliament is far from perfect. This is evident
from the way in which the representatives in the portfolio committee have to
play two level games. On the one hand the representatives have to take their
constituencies into consideration, whereas at the same time they have to play
the role of international citizens making decisions on behalf of the international
community. Quoting again from Van Wyk,
Foreign policy making is an inherently political process. In explaining
the role of parliament in the foreign policy process, decision-makers are
viewed as coping simultaneously with the pressures and constraints of
their domestic political constituency as well as those of the international
environment. This so-called 'two level game' must take into account
the broad spectrum of domestic political actors such as political party
caucuses, political opposition, and the dynamics of the Portfolio
Committee on Foreign Affairs as well as international actors."
Apart from debates in the general assembly, two portfolio committees -
Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry - had regular meetings to discuss the
developments surrounding the negotiations and for the negotiators to report
back to parliament on their actions. Again Van Wyk notes that 'the
restructuring and extension of the parliamentary committee system has
created important opportunities for the foreign policy-making process in South
Africa.:"
69 Van Wyk, J. Parliament and Foreign Affairs: Continuity or Change? In SAIlA, 1997, South
African of International Affairs. Johannesburg. pp189-213
70 Van Wyk, J. Parliament and the Foreign Policy Process. In SAIIA. 1998/9 South African
Yearbook of International Affairs. Johannesburg.
71 Op Cit. Continuity or Change?
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The South African parliament's democratisation process is far from complete,
however, it managed to playa significant role within the negotiations with the
European Union.72
4.1.2 Parliament and the SA-EU Negotiations
Dr Rob Davies who chairs the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry, and
who often chaired the joint sessions with Foreign Affairs, played a critical role
in analysing the proposed deal, searching for alternative avenues and
explaining the implications of the deal to fellow parliamentarians and ordinary
citizens alike. He spoke at numerous conferences and briefed parliament on
developments on regular occasions.
Parliament also played the critical role of ratifying the aqreement." On the
occasion of South Africa's accession to the Lomé Convention parliament
refused to ratify until the European Union clarified certain elements of the
deal. So in effect, parliament checked that the deal reached between the
negotiators was acceptable to the people of South Africa.
Levermore et al note the following on parliament's role in the negotiation
process:
'Firstly, it participated in the discussion surrounding the future of the
Lomé and South Africa's possible entry into the African, Caribbean and
Pacific (ACP) group, and was an observer at the EU-ACP joint
assembly in October 1994. Following the start of the TDCA
negotiations, parliament also maintained regular confact with decision-
72 For a more complete discussion on South Africa's parliament and suggestions for change
towards a more democratic parliament see Van Wyk, J. Op Cit. Parliament and the Foreign
Policy Process. And Van Wyk, J. Parliament and the foreign Policy Process, 1994-1999. In
SAil A. 1999/2000. South African Yearbook of International Affairs. Johannesburg.
73 Article 31 of the South African Constitution provides for the negotiating and signing of
international agreements. An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has
been approved by both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. In Van
Wyk. Op Cit. Continuity or Change?
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making bodies within the EU, whilst various chamber (such as
Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, and Trade & Industry) were asked by
government to produce commentary on the EU mandates. Similarly
parliament formed a SACU parliamentary liaison committee which
explored various potential impacts of the TDCA for the BLNS states.
The second aspect of parliament's involvement in the statal decision-
making process related to a review it undertook prior to the (South
African) ratification of the agreement. The National Assembly's
committees on trade and industry, foreign affairs and agriculture and
land convened a half-day of public hearings on many facets of the
TDCA. The final stage of parliaments involvement in the TDCA
process came when it ratified the agreement in November 1999.,74
In other words parliament in many ways facilitated debate amongst various
stakeholders, not only inside South Africa's borders but also including
neighbouring countries that will be impacted by the agreement. One could,
therefore, conclude that parliament promoted participation in policy
formulation and acted democratically.
4.2 Government
During the negotiations a large number of government departments and
bodies were roped in to participate, either directly with the negotiations or to
comment on mandates and offers from the European Union.
4.2.1 Government Departments
The main department responsible for the negotiations was the Department of
Trade and Industry, although the chief negotiator, Ambassador Eltie Links,
was recruited from the Department of Foreign Affairs, which played second
chair to the DTI. To the outsider it seemed as if the two departments were
74 Levermore, R; Gibb, R; Cleary, M. 2000. The SA-EU TOGA: An Analysis of Oecision-
making Procedures and Processes in South Africa. SAIIA Report Nr15. SAIIA,
Johannesburg. pp10
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divided into the 'hard' and 'soft' negotiators. Whereas Trade and Industry took
the hard line and were often unrelentless during talks, Foreign Affairs had to
ensure that on a diplomatic level relations between the two parties remained
amicable. It was also clear that Foreign Affairs tended to focus on the political
implication of a deal - any deal for that matter - whereas Trade and
Industry was aware that each concession that was made would have an effect
on some businessman somewhere in South Africa and in the European
Union.
However, as pointed out a number of other departments were also involved in
the negotiations. Most importantly, the Department of Agriculture played a
pivotal role in the negotiations surrounding tariff liberalisation in agriculture. In
addition they had the unenviable task of having to conclude a wine and spirits
and fishing agreement with their counterparts.
Another department involved was the Department of Finance. As Levermore
et al note,
'[Their participation] is mainly due to the trade liberalisation measures it
advocates through the establishment of the Growth, Employment, and
Redistribution macro-economic policy (GEAR).'75
Significantly, Ambassador Links was previously in the Department of Finance
and therefore still maintained close links with his former colleagues.
The wide spread of government departments that were involved in the
negotiations ensured that the interests of a large number of South Africans
was represented during the talks. However, a glaring omission from
government departments was the Department of Labour.
75 Ibid pB
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4.2.2 Government Institutions
A couple of government institutions played an important role in finalising
South Africa's mandate and delivering continuous input to the negotiations.
The most important of these is probably NEDLAC. As pointed out, it is a tri-
partite organisation made up government officials, labour organisation and
business organisations. There are 19 business organisation (including
Business South Africa and the National African Federated Chamber of
Commerce) three organised labour movements, including COSATU.
Community sectors are also represented, but only in the Development
Chamber and had very little opportunity within the formal NEDLAC structure to
raise their opinion.
NEDLAC itself was convinced that it played a pivotal role in the negotiations
and one representative even mentioned to the author that they had a
ratification righf6. It was felt that if NEDLAC did not agree with the final
agreement there would be no deal. This was, however, denied by the
negotiators themselves who confirmed that only parliament would be able to
halt the signing of the deal once the negotiators had completed their task
around the negotiating table.
Nonetheless, NEDLAC provided input to the negotiations as highly skilled
people with knowledge of the impact of tariffs and free trade were given the
opportunity to engage with government. It also provided an opportunity for
labour to raise its concerns in a small forum that had direct access to the
talks. (It is significant to note that the Department of Labour played no active
role in the negotiations, which left very little opportunity for labour to air their
significant doubts about the agreement.)
The Department of Trade and Industry made a specific commitment to holding
report back sessions with NEDLAC after each round of negotiations.
76 Numerous interviews with a number of NEDLAC representatives.
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According to Willem Smalberger this was done in order to promote
participation, accountability and the democratic process."
Levermore et al also point to the important role that NEDLAC played.
U[ .. ] [N]umerous presentations were made in the strategy formulation
stage, when South Africa began to develop its mandate. During the
negotiating process, the Trade and Industry chamber met before and
after each meeting between the EU and South Africa. An important
sub-committee (TESELICO) was also established, and was used as a
consultative forum for government trade negotiators to liase with
business and labour, whilst monitoring the bi-Iateral discussion
between the DTl's sectoral divisions.i"
Another tri-partite organisation, the Agricultural Trade Forum, also met
regularly to discuss the agricultural side of the talks. In retrospect the South
African negotiators managed to secure somewhat of a negotiating victory in
the agricultural department, the success of which should also be accredited to
the ongoing talks between government, farmers and labourers.
Finally, the South African Board on Tariffs and Trade, the BTI, were
extensively consulted during the negotiations. Essentially the negotiations
boiled down to talks about the dismantling of tariffs and the input of the BTI
was crucial. Not only did they have a superior knowledge of South Africa's
somewhat complicated tariff structure, but they were also included for their
knowledge on rules of origin and the impact liberalisation would have on the
Southern African Customs Union (SACU).
77 Numerous interviews with Willem Smalberger, South African Department of Trade and
Industry.
78 Op Cit. Levermore pp74
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Levermore et af9 argue further that it was at the BTT level that individuals
could influence the statal policy formulation process. They sought input from
a wide selection of role players and received numerous discussions on
various aspects of the agreement. These submission were discussed and
where deemed necessary passed on to the official negotiators.
4.3 Bureaucracy
4.3.1 The Democratisation of the South African Bureaucracy
In 1994 the state inherited a bulky bureaucracy comprising almost exclusively
white government officials that had served the National Party government
over the last couple of decades. It was clear that a radical shift needed to
take place and yet the white population had the expertise on how to run the
country, whereas this knowledge was lacking in the previously disadvantaged
communities. However, certain steps were taken. A number of high-ranking
officials were offered early retirement, whereas others left out of choice.
Fabricius argues that the Department of Foreign Affairs lost control over a
number of foreign policy decisions as government wanted to keep them away
from the National Party appointed Director General of Foreign Affairs, Dr
Rusty Evans" In addition, under the leadership of a placid minister, Dr Alfred
Nzo, foreign policy decisions fell back to the executive, especially the then
deputy president, Thabo Mbeki.
'The abandonment of foreign policy to other departments is not only a
loss to the DFA. The country loses too through the inefficient allocation
of taxpayer's money to fund a foreign affairs bureaucracy that has been
rendered partly redundant. More significantly, it damages the co-
ordination of foreign relations, since Foreign Affairs by its nature is the
79 Ibid pp 76
80 Fabricius, P. Virtuosity versus Bureaucracy. In SAIIA. 1999/2000. South African Yearbook
of International Affairs. Johannesburg. pp217-224
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only institution properly briefed and equipped to ensure that all foreign
relations are harmonised for the greater national good .'81
However, it was not only a question of transforming the people that worked for
the state. The old system of divided government with departments for various
race groups and homelands was amalgamated into one.
In the first place, the old departments of foreign affairs had to be transformed,
or more accurately, the departments of the former TBVC states (Transkei,
Bophuthatswana, Venda and the Ciskei) had to be amalgamated into the
South African Department of Foreign Affairs. In addition, the old guard that
formed part of the National Party had to be moved out of strategic positions
and replaced with ANC officials. However, the entire department could not be
discarded and replaced as the new government did not have the manpower to
do so. Still in need of the expertise and contacts of a number of old officials,
the department was slow in changing its face from dominantly white to a
representative mix of the South African population.
'This process has also involved the integration of 1,900 personnel from
the old DFA with 140 from the liberation movements including the ANC,
as well as 415 from the nominally independent former homelands of
[... ] the TBVC states. The Department was subsequently downsized to
a number under 1,900 today. It has encompassed the establishment of
new diplomatic styles, given that white South Africa's diplomacy was
principally geared to preventing and offsetting the effects of isolation,
while the ANC sought to intensify the boycott and sanctions campaign
as a strategy to end apartheid. The TBVC 'diplomats' had little or no
international experience save for postings in each other's 'countries'
and South Africa, given that they were not recognised internationally.
New, transparent bureaucratic procedures and new training regimes
81 Ibid.
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have also been constructed in line with the democratic instincts of the
new order.,82
These changes were further complicated by international shifts in focus from
realist politics to a recognition that markets mostly dominated political
interactions. Mills states that,
'[I]n an age when much of foreign relations is, in essence, foreign
economic relations, and given the need to address social inequalities
through economic growth, it is inevitable that South Africa's foreign
policy will be geared to this end. As Nelson Mandela put it in 1993:
"The primary motivation of the ANC's foreign economic policies as a
whole will be to place South Africa on the path of rapid economic
development with a view to addressing three key problem areas: slow
growth, severe poverty, and extreme inequalities in living standarcs.":"
This meant that the South African Department of Trade and Industry had to be
incorporated in the formulation of foreign policy and indeed in representing
South African interests at international missions. Although South Africa has
not gone as far as Australia that now only has one ministry for both foreign
affairs and trade and industry, considerable moves towards closer co-
operation between these two departments have been made.
A co-operative relationship between the foreign service and other areas
of government, particularly those concerned with international trade
and investment, is required. For example, given the centrality of
commercial issues to international diplomacy and the' growing linkage
between foreign and domestic policies, an amalgamation of the
diplomatic arms of the South African DFA and the Department of Trade
and Industry has been seen to be long overdue. [... ] The outcome of
82 Mills, G. SA Foreign Policy after Mandela. In SAIIA. 1999/2000. South African Yearbook of
International Affairs. Johannesburg.pp1-13
83 Mills, G. South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Year in Review in SAil A. 1997. South African
Yearbook of International Affairs. Johannesburg.pp1-17
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the Presidential Review Commission on this issue is awaited with
interest. ,84
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has arguably been more
successful at transforming the face and activities of the department towards a
more representative mix of South Africans and also towards a focus on the
concerns that the new ANC government was facing. Shifts towards the
development of previously disadvantaged sectors of the economy were
shadowed by international policies that would encourage sustainable growth
and result in job creation at home. Under the very apt leadership of Minister
Alex Erwin, the department underwent a radical change, but without ever
loosing sight of its goal and mission. The difficulties first emerged when the
two departments DTI and DFA had to start co-operating and acting in
cohesion on international fora and in international negotiations.
4.3.2 The Bureaucracy and the SA-EU Negotiations
Other departments that were involved in the negotiations include the
Departments of Agriculture and Finance. Agriculture has gained a reputation
for representing only white farmers in South Africa. The department of
Finance has been somewhat better at transforming, but as in many other
departments the progress has been slow.
In sum, the department in control of the negotiations, Trade and Industry, has
the most representative mix of bureaucrats, whereas Foreign Affairs and
Agriculture are transforming more slowly and could therefore be mistaken for
representing a different interest than that of the majority of South Africans.
However, the ministers in charge of the operation made sure that the officials
were accountable and that their actions were as transparent as possible.
84 Op Cit. SA Foreign Policy after Mandela.
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The large mix of departments involved also went a long way towards
representativeness of interests. Under the previous government such a deal
would have almost exclusively been negotiated at executive level.
4.4 Popular Input by Civil Society
4.4.1 The Democratisation of Civil Society
'An area which has not received much scholarly attention is the role of
civil society in the crafting, shaping and influencing the conduct of South
Africa's foreign relations. Since South Africa's democratic transition in
1994, there were great expectations-given the ANC's avowed
commitment to 'democratising' foreign policy-that civil society and its
sub-species, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), would enjoy a
robust and active engagement in the process of charting South Africa's
place and (re)entry in world affairs.,85
However, this has not always been the case. There seems to be some kind of
caution on the part of government to be seen to side or accept input from any
research organisation in South Africa that does not have a stated aim of
supporting the ANC-led government. Nevertheless there is a large number of
analysts in independent think-tanks that comment on foreign policy
formulation.
'The institutional resources which the government can call on to help
formulate foreign policy are vast compared with those of many, if not
most, countries of the same size and wealth. At the ideas level, there is
a fairly substantial body of university international relations
departments and independent foreign policy institutes producing an
impressive volume of foreign policy ideas and recommendations that
are reasonably well disseminated in the media.,86
85Le Pere, G. & Vickers, B. SAPSA unpublished paper.
86Fabricius, P. Virtuosity Versus Bureaucracy. In SAIIA. 1999/2000. South African Yearbook
of International Affairs. Johannesburg. pp217 -224
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Between these organisations there emerges a certain sense of rivalry for the
little input government allows. This rivalry extends further towards the realms
of funding. With international aid and local investments being geared towards
primary service delivery little funds are left for academics and thinkers in the
realms of foreign policy and foreign trade policy.
'The continued need to shape a South African foreign policy national
agenda in [a national oriented] way points also to the role played by civil
society institutions. It is indeed regrettable that at a time that South
Africa needs independent, constructive dialogue apart from the dominant
government, such institutions are battling to survive. South Africa will be
poorer if it is to rely solely on government for ideas, analysis and
management; and poorer still if the external debate is dominated by
external, non-South African civil society tnstltutlons.:"
4.4.2 Civil Society and the SA-EU Negotiations
Although the influence that ordinary citizens had on the negotiating process
remains difficult to gage, there was no lack of popular interest throughout the
long years of negotiation. The rounds of talks received regular and well-
informed media coverage and a popular radio station, Radio SAFM, even
encouraged listeners to air their views on the talks. Actuality programmes on
all the major television news stations hosted experts on regular occasions to
discuss the details of the negotiations.
Academic interest in the talks was high from the outset, with a number of
thesis's focusing on the implications of free trade between the European
Union and South Africa on the South African and European economies, the
future of the Lomé Convention, regional integration in Southern Africa and the
Southern African Customs Union.
87 Mills, G. SA Foreign Policy after Mandela. In SAIIA. 1999-2000. South African Yearbook
of International Affairs. Johannesburg. pp1-13
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Independent research organisations - both in South Africa and in a number
of European countries - were also following the negotiations closely and
even did a number of impact studies, although none of these could be
conclusive due to the lack of statistical data. A number of conferences were
organised in order to share expert views. The negotiators were themselves
present at some of these conferences, mostly to share their expertise, but
also to gain an understanding of popular opinion. Other NGO's like church
organisations, were also concerned about the impact the agreement might
have and commissioned their own studies and even hosted conferences to
discuss the implications.
One particular conference, hosted by the Foundation for Global Dialogue (now
the Institute for Global Dialogue), seemingly had a significant influence on the
negotiators. The conference was held at a critical juncture when South Africa
was examining the European mandate and formulating the response in the
form of the South African negotiating mandate. The idea of a trade and
development agreement was first mentioned at this conference, discussed
amongst the various experts that were attending and subsequently became
the main thrust of the South African mandate."
88 In his summation of the proceedings of the conference Rob Davies notes that '[t]he third
scenario is the trade and development agreement (TOA). Like everybody else I think that we
all heard about this concept for the first time yesterday.' In Houghton. 1997. Trading on
Development: South Africa's Relations with the European Union. Johannesburg.
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CHAPTER FIVE: EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON POLICY FORMULATION
After having examined parliament's, the bureaucracy's, government's and civil
society's influence on the negotiations one is want to conclude that from the
South African perspective the negotiations surrounding the establishment of
the SA-EU TDCA were highly democratic. The process was transparent,
inclusive, representative and open. However, the outcome of these talks were
to a large extent a foregone conclusion before South Africa even drafted its
first mandate. The reasons for this are discussed below.
5.1 Why was the outcome to a large extent a foregone conclusion?
Despite the democratic government, its transparent institutions and its wide-
spread consultation with stake holders the outcome of the negotiations were
to a large extent a foregone conclusion. The details of the talks were reduced
to haggling over percentages and quotas, but the fact that the two parties
would establish a free trade agreement, supported by co-operation
agreements and South Africa's partial accession to the Lomé Convention was
clear from the beginning. The only option South Africa had was not to
conclude a deal, which really was no option at all.
Democratic and democratisation theory leaves little room to explain this,
mostly as most theories accept the sovereignty of the state and regard
democratic processes as mostly internal to the state. However, this can no
longer be the case and there is an urgent need for a re-evaluation of theories
that exclude global developments. (See Introduction and the work of William
Robinson.)
Held also laments this, as he writes:
'The sovereignty of the nation-state has generally not been questioned.
It has been assumed that the state has control over its own fate,
subject only to compromises it must make and limits imposed by
actors, agencies and forces operating within its territorial boundaries,
f4
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and by the agents and representatives of other governments and
states .... The world putatively outside the nation-state - the dynamics
of the world economy, the rapid growth of transnational links and major
changes to the nature of international law, for example - has barely
been examined, and its implications for democracy have not been
thought out at all by democratic political theorists.' 89
In his work on models of democracy Held identifies four disjunctures between
the sovereignty of the state over policy formulation and the global theatre the
state has to operate in, these include the world economy, international political
policy formulation, international law and international culture and the
environment. Two of these are of concern to this study, namely the world
economy and the role of international organisations. In addition the very
nature of the European Union is examined as another disjuncture to South
Africa's foreign trade policy formulation.
5. 1. 1 Globalisation
Identifying globalisation as one of the disjunctures, Held comments as follows:
'[ ... ] [T]he internationalisation of production, finance and other
economic resources is unquestionably challenging the capacity of an
individual state (whether democratic or not) to control its own economic
future. At the very least, there appears to be a shift in the costs and
benefits of the policy choices before governments, thereby affecting
their autonomy; and a disjuncture between the idea of a sovereign
state determining its own future and the eireurnstances of modern
economies, marked as they are by the intersection of national, regional
and international economic forces. ,90
89 Held, D. 1996. Models of Democracy Polity Press, Cambridge.
90 Ibid
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With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the international shift towards
democracy, globalisation emerged as a powerful international phenomenon
that analysts struggle to define but which affects each and every individual on
earth." This has been summed up by the catch-all term 'globalisation',
denoting a process, which Elra Zwingle has summed up as a 'reality, not a
choice'. As she has noted, 'Goods move. People move. Ideas move. And
cultures change. The difference now is in the speed and scope of these
changes.' Various aspects of these manifestations of discussed below:
'There has been a massive increase in global capital mobility. The share of
transborder capital flows to gross domestic product (GOP) increased by a
factor of 10 between 1980-92. Capital is now managed around the clock in
globally integrated markets working in real time, connecting currencies,
savings and investments world-wide. An estimated US$1.5 trillion is traded
world-wide each day - of which some 85% is believed to be 'hot' money,
portfolio flows rather than foreign direct investment (FOI). Private investment
in Africa, for example, rose from less than US$1 billion annually at the start of
this decade to US$11.7 billion in 1996, or half of the capital flowing into the
region. The level of foreign investment is now a (some would argue 'the')
critical determinant of the pace of economic growth.
Trade has increased substantially. In 1963, world exports stood at US$154
billion. This grew to US$1 trillion in 1977, and to over US$2.5 trillion today.
The global customer, wherever located, has become king. The best buy is the
key spending criterion, rather than concerns about the country of origin, local
unemployment or trade deficits. This offers great opportunities to globally
competitive corporations, but poses threats to those which are inefficient and
no longer protected. It has become an article of faith that free trade equals
economic growth through the importation of technology, and improvements in
competitiveness and productivity. Studies show that developing countries with
open economies grew by 4.5% annually in the 1970s and 1980s; but those
91 The following paragraphs are an extract from Bertelsmann-Scott, T, Gibb, R & Mills, G
2000 The EU-SA Agreement in a Global Context SAIIA, Johannesburg.
76
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
with closed economies expanded by only 0.7%. Developed, open economies
grew by 2.3% annually; closed ones by 0.7%. Closed economies are defined
as those with the features of high import tariff and non-tariff barriers, a
socialist economic system, a state monopoly on important exports, and a big
gap between official and black-market exchange rates. It is difficult to work out
whether protected economies do badly because they are cosseted, or
because they have unsound macro-economic practices. Yet this does not
challenge the essential argument of the 'free trade growth' thesis concerning
developing countries - that there is a striking correlation between export
growth and overall GDP growth.'92
This has left little option for developing countries but to accept that the
liberalisation of trade will allow them to participate in the globalisation process
from which they can then reap the benefits of increased GDP activity. This is
directly applicable to South Africa, a country that has a recent history of
extreme isolation and now needs accelerated GDP growth in order to provide
employment for the millions of poor in the country. This is also the stated aim
of the South African government through the GEAR policy. Had South Africa
accepted any other form of agreement with the EU than a free trade
agreement, it could have undermined it GEAR strategy and it re-entry to the
world economy.
'In addition, there is a growing debate around the utility of aid as a tool for
upliftment. For example, it is true that much assistance given to Africa's
dysfunctional states has been stolen or wasted, but then again most of what
has been stolen was taken by regimes. For much of the time, such
assistance would appear to have been used by the recipient states to buy
influence or give business to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or
multilateral agencies, regardless of the effects on the people on the ground for
whom the aid was intended. On the other hand, the international community
has little understanding of the needs that aid purports to address.?"
92 Ibid.
93lbid.
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It was clear from the outset that South Africa had little option but to enter into
a sophisticated agreement with Europe on a par with relationships between
equal developed partners. South Africa no longer had the choice of a
relationship that would not rest on reciprocity as so many other developing
countries have had in the past. It is universally accepted today that protecting
developing countries from global economic activity can actually do more harm
than good in the long term. South Africa, therefore, did not have the option of
acceding to the Lomé Convention and could only negotiate the terms of the
free trade agreement.
It is in this climate that participation in the world economy has become a
prerequisite for economic prosperity and no longer the choice of governments.
As pointed out free trade plays a great role in promoting globalisation.
Throughout Thabo Mbeki's presidency - and in fact already during the
Mandela presidency - government has been quoted as saying that South
Africa has to beconie a global actor. It is, therefore, also that the macro-
economic strategy of the government, GEAR, is focused on the liberalisation
of trade and international strategies to become more competitive - which of
course limited the possibilities of alternative agreements with the EU.
5.1.2 The Restrictions placed on the Negotiations by the EU
In order to understand the limited options the European Union made available
to South Africa during the negotiations, it is crucial to understand how South
Africa fits into the myriad of relationships and agreements the EU has with the
rest of the world.
5.1.2.1 The Pyramid of EU trade relations with the world
The EU's global trade policy can be envisaged within a pyramid structure.
Right at the top is the EU itself, as trade between these countries is
completely unrestricted. As one moves down the pyramid, access to the EU
markets becomes less and less preferential, with the Most Favoured Nation
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(MFN) status - a general concession as determined by the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) - at the very bottom.
European Union
European Economic Area
Central and Eastern European Countries
FTA's: Israel, Morocco, Turkey and Tunisia
Mediterranean Countries
African Caribbean and Pacific Countries
Generalised System of Preference
Other Countries: MFN treatment"
At the time that negotiations were initiated between South Africa and the EU,
Pretoria ranked very Iowan the pyramid, having had access only to the
Union's General System of Preferences. It would, therefore, only have been
natural to move South Africa higher up on the pyramid. Obviously South
Africa could never become part of the EU, but it could fit into the next-best slot
of a Free Trade Area.
It is, therefore, clear that when talks were initiated between South Africa and
the European Union about the future of the relationship between these two
parties, South Africa only had a limited amount of options. South Africa would
not be granted full membership of the Lomé Convention, which basically only
left two further options: the status quo - at the time this was limited access
to the GSP with the strong possibility of extending it - or a free trade
agreement. As Rob Davies pointed out the GSP had some serious
limitations. ' Excluded from the agricultural GSP, for instance, will be such
products as red meat, deciduous fruit, wine and grapes; that is, a number of
areas where South Africa is currently most cornpetitive.t'"
94 Koning A, 'The EU's Trade and Development Policy" in Trade and Development. Cape
Town: Galvin and Sales, 1997.
95 Davies, R. 'Analysis if the negotiation process: Critical Areas, Contradictions and
Commonalties.' In Houghton, R 1997, Trading on Development. Johannesburg
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Part of the problem was that South Africa opted for 'developed' status within
the World Trade Organisation and it is this organisation that provides the rules
for GSP. In other words, in terms of the WTO charter South Africa was not
really entitled to GSP but was granted this by special arrangement with the
EU.
The second option - which emerged as the only real viable alternative option
- was the negotiation of a free trade agreement. At this is then also what
South Africa had to settle for.
5.1.3 International Organisations
With the advent of globalisation the world has also witnessed a massive
increase in international organisations. Held points out that:
'The growth in the number of these new forms of political organisation
reflects the rapid expansion of transnational links, the growing
interpenetration of foreign and domestic policy, and the corresponding
desire by most states for some form of international governance and
regulation to deal with collective policy problems.t'"
One of these organisations is the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which
was established on 1 January 1995, by the 128 members of GATT, through a
Ministerial Declaration signed in April 1994 in Marrakech, Morocco. It is both
an institution to govern international trade and negotiations, and a body of
law, which contains and administers a number of legal agreements on how
countries should conduct international trade, ranging in specificity from the
Agreement on Agriculture to the Agreement on Import Licensing
Procedures".
96 Ibid
97The origins of the WTO lie in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
established as the third pillar of the Bretton Woods system, alongside the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, (or the World Bank), and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). According to the "Havana Charter" GATT was initially supposed to be an
International Trade Organisation, but opposition from the US reduced it to a mere agreement.
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The logic behind this was that if barriers to trade, especially tariff barriers,
could be removed, less-efficient industries would no longer be protected. This
in turn would encourage countries that have a comparative advantage in a
certain product, to produce the bulk of it, leaving others to tend to their own
particular product that enjoys a comparative advantage. According to the
advocates of free trade all nations will then be better off: if there are no
restrictions then the most that can possibly be produced will be produced and
there will be more products to circulate on ground level.
Both South Africa and all the members of the European Union are members
of the WTO. This means that a free trade agreement between these two
parties had to be negotiated with the WTO rules on FTA's in mind. These
rules stipulate that substantially all trade has to be included in such an
agreement, which translates into more or less 90% of all trade between the
two parties. This meant that South Africa could not expect any special
favours from Europe within a free trade agreement. A unique relationship
outside the FTA mould was also out of the question, as the WTO stipulates
that any concessions offered to another country outside of an FTA, will have
to be extended to all other WTO members.
In this way the negotiations between South Africa and the EU were further
limited.
GATT was initially signed by 23 nations in 1947, and was a legally binding codification of
rules for the conduct of trade among its member states. Its general goal was to maximise
growth in world trade and the global economy through the reduction in trade barriers pursued
on a non-discriminatory basis. Its primary function was, therefore, to encourage the trading
nations of the world to adhere to the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle, which involves a
commitment to non-discrimination.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
The thesis found two potential reasons why the democratisation of foreign
trade policy is important to newly established democracies. On the one hand
it is important in order to attract foreign direct investment and to become an
active player in the global economy; and on the other it facilitates the
consolidation of democracy through consultative policy formulation processes.
The process of democratising a country's foreign trade policy should bring the
state closer to a form of government - a democracy - that has three
defining characteristics, namely consultative policy formulation and debate
over policy decisions and a government that is responsive to the needs of its
citizens.
6.1 The Impact of Parliament, the Bureaucracy, Government and Civil
Society
In the introduction to this thesis it was stated that four variables would be used
to evaluate whether South Africa's foreign policy formulation has been
democratised. The four identified were participation, transparency, openness
and representation as they translate into the functions of parliament, the
bureaucracy, government and civil society.
The thesis examined the roles these institutions and civil society played during
the EU-SA TOGA negotiations and how they themselves have been
transformed since the inauguration of South Africa's first democratically
elected government. The thesis concludes that huge steps have been taken
during the first five years of democratic South Africa to transform the state
apparatus.
Despite the constraints of having inexperienced parliamentarians, the South
African parliament ensured a good level of participation and transparency
primarily through its own transformation. Secondly, the efforts of individuals in
the foreign policy and trade and industry portfolio committees have
contributed to an interested and well-informed parliament that regularly
scrutinised the actions of the negotiators. This in turn enhanced participation
82
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
and transparency. However, it is doubted that without these individuals that
the same amount of participation and transparency would have been
achieved. These characteristics should perhaps rather be attributed to Rob
Davies, than the institution.
The arduous task of transforming the bureaucracy has been high on the
government's agenda since 1994. The departments that were involved in the
negotiations (the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Industry,
Agriculture and Finance) have not equally transformed their civil servants into
a more representative mix of South Africans. However, DTI, that de facto led
the negotiations, has been applauded for its swift and effective transformation.
Although DFA and the Department of Agriculture were falling short of a truly
transformed bureaucracy during the negotiations an adequate level of
representation had been achieved. This also contributed to a transparent
process.
The inclusion of a large number of government departments and institutions in
the negotiations ensured a large degree of representation. However, the
exclusion of the Department of Labour was a serious omission and creates
the impression that mere lip-service was paid to the concerns labour raised in
the NEDLAC forum. Nevertheless, the NEDLAC process ensured a high level
of transparency, as each round of talks was discussed with labour, business
and civil society.
Traditionally civil society has been excluded from the foreign policy
formulation process, however, a remarkably high level of civil society
participation was noted during the SA-EU TDCA negotiations'. This openness
has provided an interesting precedent for future policy formulations in South
Africa. Future studies could focus on other areas of policy formulation and
test whether the EU-SA TDCA negotiations were unique in their democratic
nature, or whether this has become a characteristic of South African policy
formulation. It is suspected that the EU-SA TDCA was a unique process as no
other foreign trade policy formulated attracted as much public attention or
scrutiny.
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Despite this relative positive report card on the South African negotiating
team, it has to be noted that there was limited scope for far-reaching
participation. The bulk of trade negotiations is concerned with tariff lines and
complicated international rules, which could only have been dealt with by
experts. South Africans could contribute to the general framework of the
agreement, but officials in the Department of Trade and Industry determined
the actual content.
If we reconsider the guiding definition used in this thesis to define democracy,
and evaluate its three elements (public participation, public contestation and
responsive decision makers) against the context of the negotiations, one has
to place a question mark over the responsiveness of parliament, the
government and the bureaucracy. Whether free trade is in the best interest of
the millions of un- and underemployed citizens of South Africa, is debatable.
Although the outcomes of free trade are not strictly predictable (and it is most
often argued that there are great opportunities in the TOGA), South Africa can
expect the closure of a number of companies. The benefits of free trade are
also not expected to rapidly trickle down to grass-route level and will
predominantly benefit those that are already economically self-sufficient.
Why did the South Africa government embark on such a consultative
approach to the negotiations if the end result was a foregone conclusion and
not in the interest of its main constituency? This is a difficult question to
consider, as the answer must lie somewhere between the governments own
ignorance of the rules of the global system and a misplaced belief that South
Africa could bend these rules; and the government's efforts to consolidate
democracy internally by consulting broadly on economic policy.
6.2 The Democratisation of South Africa's Foreign Policy
In the introduction it was argued that globalisation has contributed to a world-
wide trend in democratisation. Although one would like to conclude that this
has been a positive development, William Robinson argues that this is only an
~4
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extension of US economic hegemony. Democratic forms of government
promote participation in the global economy, that in turn benefits economic
powers in the developed nations.
Although there is much truth in this argument, it is equally true that a
democratic state remains a form of government that can guarantee freedom
and civil rights, and therefore remains attractive. Whereas globalisation and
its proponents predominantly remain interested in the aspects of democracy
that promote open markets, internal consolidation of democracy is of utmost
importance to the state's citizens. To ensure participation, debate and
informed policy formulations is in the interest of a government that is
concerned with its own survival.
States therefore pay attention to the democratisation of the state apparatus as
this process is essential to the stability of any democracy. Mass consultation
on economic policies has been identified as key to the consolidation of newly
. formed democracies and in the globalised world we live in this also implies the
democratisation of foreign and foreign trade policy.
However, this is not unproblematic. Globalisation has limited the options for
domestic economic policy and has virtually closed the door on all other
options but free trade for foreign trade policy. No matter how inclusive foreign
trade policy formulation is, the rules of the game have been set and actors are
only allowed to read their lines. This leaves little room for governments to be
responsive to their citizen's needs.
This is not a very satisfactory conclusion given the enormous, resources spent
on ensuring that the negotiations surrounding the SA-EU FTA were conducted
in a democratic manner.
If we were to consider the second Hypothesis proposed in the introduction to
this thesis - that the democratisation of foreign trade policy is a crucial
element in the consolidation of democracy in new democratic states - then
the time and resources spent were not all in vain. Consulting on such a broad
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base has given South African's a feeling of ownership over the agreement and
has heightened the awareness of the possibilities it holds for businesses in
the country. In addition, the knowledge gained through widespread
consultation can be effectively put to use in future negotiations and in
promoting South Africa in the global economy.
It has also kindled the interest in scholarly work on developing countries'
relationships with those of the developed world. This research will especially
benefit South Africa in the years to come in talks with the WTO and other
trading partners. The length of the negotiations has also had the benefit that
a number of officials have gained great experience in negotiating international
agreements. Although they were initially on a steep learning curve, the
negotiators have done well in securing a number of benefits for South Africa in
the agreement.
Although the possibilities were limited, there are some real opportunities for
South Africans in the agreement. The process by which the agreement was
negotiated, although complicated, lengthy and perhaps without tangible
benefits, has brought South Africans closer together in an understanding of
one another's needs, which is ultimately key to the consolidation of
democracy.
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